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COMPETING MODELS OF FAIR REPRESENTATION:
THE PERFUNCTORY PROCESSING CASES t
Ross E. CHE1T *
The duty of fair representation was created by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1944 to prevent unions from practicing racial discrimination in the negotiation
of collective bargaining agreements.' Since then, the scope of the duty has been
vastly expanded. Courts now scrutinize union activities in the negotiation, ad-
ministration, and arbitration of collective bargaining agreements not only for
racial discrimination, but for bad faith, hostility, and any other acts that might
be deemed "arbitrary" or "perfunctory."' With this expansion comes
criticism of both the theoretical assumptions that underlie the duty of fair
representation and the practical problems that its implementation
engendered.' This article examines the duty of fair representation, in the con-
text of processing employee grievances, taking as given the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in the area and exploring the extent to which these cases leave
unanswered important questions about the scope of the duty.'
t Copyright © 1982, Boston College Law School.
Ph.D. candidate, Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California,
Berkeley. B.A., 1977, Williams College; M.P.P., 1981, University of California, Berkeley;
J.D., 1981, University of California, Berkeley. Member, California Bar. Professor Jan Vetter
provided the inspiration for this article. His continued support and criticism during its prepara-
tion were valuable and much appreciated. The opinions expressed in this article are exclusively
my own.
' Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-04 (1944).
2
 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
2 See, e.g., Feller, A General Them)) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
663, 809 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Feller]; Symposium, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical
Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
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 The duty of fair representation implicates so many aspects of collective bargaining
that an analysis of the duty can easily expand into a treatise on labor law. One commentator has
successfully undertaken this ambitious task. See Feller, supra note 3. Professor Feller used a Sec-
ond Circuit fair representation case to examine all of the assumptions underlying the duty of fair
representation. This approach is much easier to admire than to duplicate. In approaching this
potentially massive topic, I chose to limit this article's scope of inquiry in two respects. It is so
limited in an effort to make sense of the existing case law and to suggest reforms that are realistic
within that framework. While this approach has certain advantages, the reader should be aware
of its limitations.
First, this article contains two major theoretical assumptions. Specifically, it assumes the
proposition, articulated in recent Supreme Court cases, that unions should have some degree of
1
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The starting point for this inquiry is Vaca v. Sipes, a 1967 U.S. Supreme
Court decision which held that unions must not process grievances in a manner
that is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. "5 Courts have invoked this
,holding repeatedly, but in such an inconsistent and confusing manner that this
area of the law is practically impossible to understand. 6 A number of verbal
formulas have been suggested in an effort both to clarify this area of the law
and to make it more equitable.' A popular view among commentators, for ex-
ample, is that the use of traditional common law negligence concepts would
discretionary power in administering the collective agreement and, in particular, the grievance
mechanism. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). Accepting this proposition, the article con-
siders the extent to which that discretion should be limited. It has been argued, however, that in-
dividuals would have the sole right to prosecute and settle claims against their employers. See,
e.g., Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362,
376-81 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Summers], Others have argued that unions should have con-
siderable discretion to decide whether to prosecute a claim. See, e.g., Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 HARv, L. REV. 601, 625-27 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Cox]. This article also
assumes the prevailing viewpoint that when appropriate a court in which a fair representation
suit is brought can resolve the merits of the underlying claim and, more importantly, award ap-
propriate relief including, possibly, monetary damages rather than merely compelling the union
and employer to arbitrate the grievance. This proposition follows directly from Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 191, 196 (1967). Yet, this proposition is also not without its opponents. Professor Feller took
exception to this point both when he argued Vaca before the Supreme Court and when he wrote
his comprehensive article on the subject. He argued that the only consequence of a union's
breach of the duty of fair representation should be an order to compel the union to proceed with
an employee's grievance. Feller, supra note 3, at 813-17.
Second, this article examines the duty of fair representation in only one context: the
processing of employee grievances. The duty of fair representation exists, however, in many
other contexts, including union negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement or arbitration of
an employee grievance. The duty of fair representation was even extended recently to a union's
monitoring of the employer's pension funds. Brown v. UAW, 512 F. Supp. 1337, 1359-61
(W.D. Mich. 1981). Although court decisions in all of these situations invoke language identical
to that used when the controversy is one of grievance administration, it is widely recognized that
these contexts are logically separable. For a discussion of the distinctions between the duty of fair
representation in the contexts of contract negotiation and administration see, Blumrosen, The
Worker and Three Phases of Unionism.' Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relation-
ship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1476 (1963); Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary
Obligations: Union Official and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Rosen]; Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agree-
ment: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 254-58 (1977). For a discussion
of the distinctions between the duty of fair representation in grievance administration and ar-
bitration see, Feller, supra note 3. Accord Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567
(1976).
386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
6 In 1979, the NLRB's General Counsel stated in an official memorandum that the
"extremely broad approach" taken by some courts in deciding fair representation cases had
"operated to adversely effect national labor policy." Memorandum 79-55, 48 U.S.L.W. 2081
(July 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as NLRB Memo]. The memo attempted to clarify the Board's
interpretation of the scope of the duty of fair representation. See infra note 126 and accompanying
text.
A variety of common law concepts have been used in the effort to lend meaning to the
duty of fair representation. The third party beneficiary, the fiduciary, and the "constituent" of a
legislator are but a few examples of the legal analogies that have been imported into fair represen-
tation decisions. As Professor Summers so wisely noted, however: "The problem presented is not
[after all] one of choosing theories, for we can draw from them only the contents which we have
placed in them. The problem is one of policy what rights should an individual have under a col-
lective bargaining agreement." See Summers, supra note 4, at 240-41.
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make fair representation law more equitable. 8 Another commentator de-
veloped an elaborate thesis that the duty of fair representation would be clearer
if viewed as a requirement of "rational decisionmaking." 9 Many judges,
however, simply argue that the duty of fair representation is a "term of art,"
not susceptible to further definition.")
The confusion in the case law, however, is not due to the inexactitudes of
language or to the failure to invoke negligence concepts. The confusion arises
because Vaca, a fair representation suit challenging the validity of a union's
reasons for failing to process a grievance, gave way to a new type of fair
representation suit which I call the "perfunctory processing" cases." Instead
of focusing on the substantive issues behind the union's decision, these cases
directly challenge the process provided by the union in arriving at its decision
not to pursue a grievance. Thus, these fair representation challenges are sub-
stantially different from those brought before Vaca. Regrettably, the courts
have not yet agreed on a consistent approach for deciding them.
Two fundamentally different approaches to the duty of fair representation
can be found within the perfunctory processing cases. One approach resembles
traditional tort law because it relies primarily on the concepts of proximate
cause and provable damages. The other emphasizes notions of due process in
the regulation of union proceedings. Because these approaches embody con-
flicting assumptions about the purpose of the duty of fair representation, it is
not surprising that the cases are confusing and often conflicting.
The main purpose of this article is to identify and compare the two com-
peting models of fair representation in the perfunctory processing cases.
Recognition of the existence of and the differences between these models — one
based on tort principles, the other on notions of due process — help explain the
confusion in the case law. The article also suggests a path towards refor-
mulating the duty of fair representation. The first part of this article traces the
evolution of the duty of fair representation. The second part explains the char-
acteristics of the perfunctory processing cases and briefly analyzes the sources
of the confusion that surrounds the duty of fair representation in these cases.
The third part sets forth the two models of fair representation that explain the
perfunctory processing cases. Finally, it is submitted that the due process-
regulation model can best balance the union's interest in preserving the
B See, e.g, Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and
a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1096, 1146-51 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Flynn & Higgins]. Accord Note, Determining Standards for a Union's Duty of Fair
Representation: The Case for Ordinary Negligence, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 624, 657 (1980).
9 Clark, supra note 3, at 1155-77. Clark's "rational basis" analysis has been cited with
approval by the Ninth Circuit on a few occasions. See Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 657
F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1981) and cases cited therein. The NLRB, however, has expressly
reserved deciding whether to adopt the "rational basis" standard. General Truck Driver's Local
315 (Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd.), 217 N.L.R.B. 616, 618 n.9 (1975).
14 See, e.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 1975); Grif-
fin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1972).
" For a more complete definition of the term perfunctory processing, see infra text ac-
companying notes 76-85.
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autonomy of the collective bargaining agreement and the individual
employee's interest in having his grievance treated fairly.
Since discussion of the duty of fair representation often dwells on abstract
words and theories, a helpful way to preface this analysis is with a few examples
that illustrate the kind of actual problems that underlie the verbiage. Consider
the plight of two employees, Ms. R and Mr. C.
Ms. R is a reservation agent for a major airline. She suffers from migraine
headaches and, as a result, has taken an extraordinary number of sick days
over the past few years. When she is on duty her speech is sometimes slurred,
her writing illegible and her work marred by mistakes. Her employer gave her
a personal leave to deal with the problem, but when her problem persisted she
was discharged. The employer did not violate the collective bargaining agree-
ment by taking this action. Still, Ms. R filed a grievance with her union. The
union represented her through the grievance procedure and eventually nego-
tiated a settlement under which she could return to work for a probationary
period. Ms. R rejected the company's settlement and requested the union to
take the matter to arbitration. The union declined and Ms. R subsequently
sued the union for failing to inform her that it would not take her claim to ar-
bitration if she rejected the company's offer.
Mr. C is an assembly line worker for a major manufacturer. He has
worked in the plant for five years, all without incident. Information provided to
a company security man, however, implicated Mr. C in recent instances of
vandalism at the plant. Mr. C was questioned along with some other
employees, all of whom were asked to take a lie detector test. Upon advice from
the union, all of the employees declined to take the test. Subsequently, Mr. C
was discharged for "failing to cooperate" with an official investigation. It is
questionable, however, whether the employer's actions were sanctioned by the
collective bargaining agreement. Mr. C filed a grievance with his union. The
union represented Mr. C through the early stages of the grievance procedure
and, after the grievance was denied, agreed to take his claim to arbitration.
Due to a clerical mistake on the part of the union, however, the notice of intent
to arbitrate was filed late and, in accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement, the case was dropped at that point. Mr. C then filed suit against his
union for breaching the duty of fair representation.
Should either of these employees have a cause of action against the union
for violating the duty of fair representation? It might seem intuitive that Mr. C
should have a cause of action and Ms. R should not. After all, Mr. C's
employer appears to have violated the collective bargaining agreement and
Mr. C's union was responsible for his seemingly valid grievance being
dropped. Ms. R's union, in contrast, negotiated a settlement for her even
though her employer acted within its rights under the collective bargaining
agreement in discharging her. Yet, in the cases on which these examples are
based, Mr. C was not allowed to proceed against his union, while Ms. R was.
In Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways,' 2 Ms. Robesky was permitted to proceed
' 2 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978).
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against her union because its failure to inform her that her grievance would not
be arbitrated was in the view of the court "without rational basis.'" 3 On the
other hand, in Coe v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers,' 4 Mr.
Coe was prohibited from proceeding against his union" because the court
determined that the mistake of the union which doomed Mr. Coe's grievance
was merely an "error" not an "arbitrary" action.' 6
The apparent contradiction between these cases is not the result of a mis-
application of existing law. The law itself is not clear. The contradiction arises
because the conclusions in these cases were deduced from unarticulated, but
differing, assumptions about the duty of fair representation. In short, these
cases reflect a fundamental disagreement over the very nature and purpose of
the duty of fair representation.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The duty of fair representation is a creation of the courts. It was conceived
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1944 in order to prevent unions acting under the
authority of the Railway Labor Act from negotiating contracts that discrimi-
nated against black employees.' 7 The Court, in Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R.,"
noted that Congress empowerd the union to be the exclusive bargaining agent
for a craft or class of railway employees." The Court reasoned that Congress,
by implication, must have intended the union to exercise that power "fairly"
and "on behalf of all those for whom it acts." 20 The Steele decision did not spe-
" Id. at 1089.
" 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 1350.
16 Id. at 1350-51.
" Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-04 (1944).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 200.
16 Id. at 202-03. See also Wallace Corp. v. Labor Bd., 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944).
Turnstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 211 (1944)
(federal courts have jurisdiction because duty of fair representation arises from federal statutory
scheme). While this hidden purpose may not have been equally visible to all, the line of reasoning
allowed the Court to leave unanswered the question whether union discrimination could be pro-
hibited on constitutional grounds. The Vasa court, referring to its opinion in Steele, maintained
that the Steele court recognized that:
The congressional grant of power to a union to act as exclusive collective bargain-
ing representative, with its corresponding reduction in the individual rights of the
employees so represented, would raise grave constitutional problems if unions
were free to exercise this power to further racial discrimination.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S 170, 182 (1967) (citing Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192,
198-99 (1944)). It is difficult to see, however, why racial discrimination poses such a "grave"
constitutional question, even in the context of union actions. The likely answer is that an equal
protection approach would raise questions in areas other than just racial discrimination. Would
unions, for example, have to avoid all "hostile discrimination?" An equal protection approach
would require the courts to decide under the Constitution which differentiations and distinctions
in union procedures are permissible and which are "plainly irrelevant." See Givens, Federal Pro-
tections of Employee Rights Within Trade Unions, 29 FoRDHAm L. REV, 259, 266 (1960). Some com-
mentators have suggested the possibility of federal due process limitations on union procedures.
See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 8, at 1100 n.15; Rosen, supra note 1, at 425-27 (1964). Professor
Summers has also stressed the significance of "elemental notions of due process" in grievance
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cifically prohibit anything other than racial discrimination in the negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements under the Railway Labor Act. Nevertheless,
the case has been cited widely for the proposition that unions must act
"without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. "721
This proposition was soon relied upon to expand the scope of the duty of
fair representation. The duty of fair representation was imposed on unions act-
ing under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act" and it was ex-
tended beyond the negotiation stage to cover actions taken during both
grievance administration and arbitration." Throughout these early develop-
ments, however, the duty of fair representation was always restricted in one
sense: it proscribed hostile and invidious discrimination only."
This restriction on the duty of fair representation was challenged in Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman." The case was brought by union members who lost
seniority because their union negotiated a contract that gave certain prefer-
ences to veterans." The U.S. Supreme Court refused to strike down such "dis-
crimination." It reasoned that various kinds of unequal treatment were inevi-
table in the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, 27 and concluded
that departure from strict seniority to give preferential treatment to veterans
was "within reasonable bounds of relevancy. "'a The Court retained the view,
first articulated in Steele, that the duty of fair representation is basically a re-
quirement of "good faith" action on the part of the union. 29 Stated in these
terms, the duty of fair representation proscribed union decisions that could be
characterized as "hostile" or in "bad faith," but allowed those based on con-
siderations deemed "relevant" to the union's decision. There was no clear
determination of the considerations which would be considered "relevant" or
proper. Such a determination, however, did not seem necessary. The law ap-
peared to allow anything that was not "hostile" or in "bad faith."
The initial cracks in this simple dichotomy for judging union behavior ap-
peared in Humphrey v. Moore," a case in which union members alleged that a
administration, but he did not specifically invoke the Constitution in support of this idea. See
Summers, supra note 4, at 394.
The majority in Steele decided, however, to avoid any constitutional questions by basing
their decision on statutory interpretation. Indeed, there were many good reasons for doing so.
Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-
Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1445-47 (1963). Professor Blumrosen argues that the
statutory approach used by the Court in Steele provided "[m]ore flexibility and versatility than
any direct application of the Constitution to trade unions." Id. at 1447.
21 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). See, e.g., Feller, supra note 3, at 809; Lewis, Fair Representa-
tion in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 107 (1967).
" 29 U.S.C. $$ 151-169 (1970). See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56
(1944).
23 Syres v. Oil Workers Local, 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
" See Clark, supra note 3, at 1121.
" 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
26 Id. at 331-35.
27 Id. at 338.
28 345 U.S. at 342.
29 Id. at 338.
3° 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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joint employer-employee "conference committee" had adopted an unfair plan
for consolidating the seniority lists from two companies." The U.S. Supreme
Court relied on largely, but not entirely familiar language in deciding that the
union did not violate its duty because it "took its position honestly, in good
faith and without hostile or arbitrary discrimination."" The Court also noted
that the union had "acted upon wholly relevant considerations not capricious
or arbitrary ones. " 33 The addition of the word "arbitrary" in this formulation,
used by the court in more than one critical passage in the opinion, suggested
the possibility of a significant change in the duty of fair representation. Were
relevant considerations now to be identified by contrast to "arbitrary," as well
as "hostile," ones? This question is of much more than semantic importance.
A proscription against "arbitrary" actions clearly would be more encompass-
ing than one against "hostile" actions. 34 Yet whether the opinion was intended
to prevent arbitrary union actions was by no means clear. On the one hand, it
31 Id. at 340. The Court treated the "conference committee" as if it were an arbitration
panel. For a discussion of the problems with this approach see, Feller, supra note 3, at 836-38.
" 375 U.S. at 350.
33 Id.
34 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had already discovered, in Miranda
Fuel Co., that the word "arbitrary" carried with it a host of implications that would significantly
alter the meaning of fair representation. See 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962). The NLRB's deci-
sion to expand the duty of fair representation accordingly was extremely controversial. Admitted-
ly, this was in large part because the case was brought as an unfair labor practices claim. In fact,
the Second Circuit refused to enforce the NLRB's position for that very reason. NLRB v. Miran-
da Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1963). Two years later, however, the Fifth Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion, deciding, in Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, that
the NLRB was correct in finding that any "arbitrary" union action could constitute an unfair
labor practice as a violation of the duty of fair representation. 368 F.2d 12, 19-20 (5th Cir. 1963),
enforcing 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1962).
Since Miranda Fuel, there has not been complete agreement, however, among the
members of the Board that a breach of the duty of fair representation motivated by other than
hostility toward non-union members should constitute an unfair labor practice. See, e.g, General
Truck Drivers Local, 692 (Great Western Unifreight System), 209 N.L.R.B. 446, 449-50 (1974)
(Member Fanning, concurring). Nevertheless, the majority of the Board clearly agrees that it
should. Id. at 447.
The status of the duty of fair representation as an unfair labor practice is still being
debated today. A committee of the American Bar Association's Section on Labor and Employ-
ment Law is currently considering two drafts of proposed amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act dealing with remedies for union breach of the duty of fair representation. Both
drafts include provisions for eliminating the NLRB's jurisdiction over fair representation cases,
and both would limit the power of federal courts to ordering the union to proceed with arbitration
in those cases in which a breach is found. This argument over the extent to which the NLRB
should have jurisdiction over fair representation cases will, for the purpose of this article, be left
aside and the NLRB cases will be considered only for their substantive contribution to the scope
of the duty itself. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT OF THE SEC-
TION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, DRAFT 5/10/82, 3633c (May 5, 1982); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, DRAFT
10B 5/10/82, 4619c (May 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as DRAFTS].
It should be noted that there are many ways in which the Board's application of fair
representation law differs from that of the federal courts. The main differences are in the struc-
turing of remedies. See generally Note, The NLRB and the Duty of Fair Representation: The Case of the
Reluctant Guardian, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 437, 446-49 (1977). The Board has, in its own words,
"adopted and applied the doctrine ... as developed by the Federal courts". General Truck
Drivers Local 315 (Rhodes & Jameison Ltd.), 217 N.L.R.B. 616, 617 (1975).
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did not openly embrace the concept of "arbitrariness" as an element in defin-
ing breaches of the duty of fair representation. On the other hand, it implied
that the concept had been adopted."
The U.S. Supreme Court's next major decision in this area, Vaca v.
Sipes, 36 addressed whether the concept of "arbitrariness" should be used as a
standard for defining possible breaches of the duty of fair representation. The
case arose as a challenge to a union's decision to drop the claim of an employee
who had been discharged for health reasons." The union had processed the
claim through four steps of the grievance procedure before deciding not to pur-
sue it further. 38 The Supreme Court had to decide when, if ever, the decision
not to take a grievance to arbitration would be considered a violation of the
duty of fair representation. The question carried with it strong philosophical
implications. The individual rights theory dictated that the union be held in
breach whenever it dropped or settled a grievance that the worker wanted to
pursue further." The union control theory would allow for compromise and
discretion on the part of the union, subject to some kind of limitation against
hostile and "arbitrary" actions."
The Missouri Supreme Court determined that the union did not have to
pursue all grievances to arbitration, but supported the individual rights theory
to a large extent, holding that if a grievance were deemed "meritorious" by the
" The word "arbitrary" was used more than once in the opinion, but since the court
concluded that the union did not breach the duty of fair representation it did not have to commit
itself to any specific application of the word. It is not clear whether the court intended to give the
word "arbitrary" its own meaning or simply intended it to cover all those situations in which the
union did not act honestly or in good faith. The court stated at the end of its opinion, for exam-
ple, that: "As far as this record shows, the union took its position honestly, in good faith and
without hostility or arbitrary discrimination." Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964).
36 386 U.S. 171, 189-95 (1966).
" The facts in Vans, as distilled from the printed record at the U.S. Supreme Court by
Feller, .supra note 3, at 701-02, are as follows: The grievant in Vaca suffered from heart disease.
Following a period of hospitalization his employer refused to let him return to work, even though
his doctor certified that he was fit for work. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175 & n.3 (1967). The
employer maintained that it would not reconsider its position unless more medical evidence was
collected. The union sent Owens to a specialist who determined that he should not return to
work. Id, at 175. The union then dropped the grievance. Id. Owens brought an action in state
court. Id. at 176. He died of a "cardiovascular accident due to hypertension" during the penden-
cy of the appeal. Id. at 174. For the published opinions in Vaca see, 59 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2165,
397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965), 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
38
 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 175 & n.3. Grievance procedures exist "in almost every
collective bargaining agreement." Feller, supra note 3, at 742 & n.350. Arbitration is usually the
final step in the grievance procedure. Most collective bargaining agreements provide for a series
of less intensive steps building up to arbitration. As Professor Feller described these procedures:
The grievance procedure normally consists of steps. First, the aggrieved employee,
or the union, raises the problem with the immediate supervisor. If the matter is not
resolved, the union can appeal to the next higher level of supervision. Depending
upon the size and complexity of the enterprise, the procedure may have three,
four, or even five steps. If the union fails to appeal from management's decision at
any step, the matter is considered settled based on the decision last made.
Id.. at 743. See also J. KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT: THE POWER OF IN-
DUSTRIAL WORK GROUPS 6-9 (1961).
39 See generally Summers, supra note 4, at 369.
40 See generally Cox, supra note 4, at 604-05.
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court or jury, then the decision not to take it to arbitration would be, by defini-
tion, a violation of the duty of fair representation.'" The U.S. Supreme Court
agreed that unions should be able to settle claims short of arbitration, but sided
more with the union control theory, holding further that the refusal of a union
to process a "meritorious" grievance should not automatically be a violation of
the duty. The Court suggested' that a union's ability to settle claims in good
faith would be "substantially undermined" 42 if a decision of a union that a par-
ticular grievance lacked sufficient merit to justify further processing could be
deemed a violation of the duty of fair representation whenever a judge or jury
disagreed with the determination." The Court balanced the individual's in-
terest in taking a grievance to arbitration against the union's interests as
coauthor of the collective bargaining agreement and concluded that a prohibi-
tion against "arbitrary" union actions would adequately protect individuals
even if the duty of fair representation were not defined entirely by judiCial
review of the underlying grievance. 44
Unfortunately, the Court was much clearer in specifying what does not
constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation than in explaining what
does. The Court tried to define the content of the union's duty in grievance ad-
ministration in portions of Vaca that have since been interpreted as a "con-
scious expansion" of the doctrine." Exactly how far the Court expanded the
duty is difficult to determine from the opinion. The general requirement that
the union avoid "arbitrary" treatment could, if Vaca were strictly construed,
be applied solely to situations in which the individual challenges the union's
decision not to take a grievance to arbitration." That was, after all, the basic
fact pattern in Vaca. The prohibition against "arbitrary conduct" potentially
could be applied to a much broader class of cases, however, if Vaca were con-
sidered a general guide to fair representation cases. It could even be applied in
cases in which the union never took the grievance to the first step in the griev-
ance procedure. Since the language in Vaca is much more expansive than re-
strictive, it should not be surprising that certain phrases in the decision are sus-
ceptible to more than one interpretation.
The most significant of these statements, for the purposes of this article, is
the proposition that "a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious
4' 397 S.W.2d 658, 665 (Mo. 1966).
42 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
4 ' Id. at 193.
44 Id. at 190-91.
45 Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 182 (kth Cir. 1972).
4' See infra text accompanying notes 71-72. The Court in Vaca considered three major
issues, each of which was left unclear. First, the Court addressed the contention that duty of fair
representation claims should be in the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 177-88 (1967). The Court decided that they should not be, without ever stating
whether the duty of fair representation is properly considered an unfair labor practice. Id. at
177-88. Instead, the Court simply "assume[d] for present purposes that a breach of the duty is an
unfair labor practice." Id. at 186. Second, the Court considered the scope of the duty of fair
representation, discussed in this article. Id. at 188-95. Third, the Court addressed the difficult
question whether damages should be recoverable and, if so, how they should be apportioned be-
tween the union and the employer in fair representation cases. Id. at 195-98. The court did not
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grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion. "47 This sentence has been the
source of considerable confusion for two reasons. First, it added yet another
word to the vocabulary of fair representation law: perfunctory. Courts are
divided as to whether this word adds new substance to the duty of fair represen-
tation or is just another way of conveying what the word "arbitrary" already
encompasses." Second, it relies on a word — meritorious — that can be inter-
preted in more than one fashion. The implications of these differing definitions
are very significant. While the word "perfunctory" might extend the scope of
the duty of fair representation, certain interpretations of the word
"meritorious" lead to a whole new class of fair representation cases.
The most common interpretation of Vaca is that it established a two-prong
test for determining whether a union's treatment of a specific grievance con-
stitutes a breach of the duty of fair representation." First, the union's conduct
must be deemed arbitrary or in bad faith. 5° This prong of the Vaca test
represents a new approach to an old problem. The Court abandoned the sim-
ple approach that had been used to analyze union actions. No longer could the
union be assured of passing the fair representation test simply by taking action
in good faith and without hostility. Such actions could be deemed "arbitrary."
Unfortunately, the decision did not define adequately the term "arbitrary,"
prompting Justice Black to chide the majority for failing to explain "what is
meant by this vague phrase and how trial judges are intelligently to translate it
to a jury. "51
decide anything more specific, however, than its remark that damages should be apportioned ac-
cording to "fault." For a discussion of the problems with this formulation, see Linsey, The Appor-
tionment of Liability for Damages Between Employer and Union in 301 Actions Involving a Union's Breach of
its Duty of Fair Representation, 30 MERCER L. REV. 661 (1979). For a criticism of the decision to
allow damages in fair representation cases, see Feller, supra note 3, at 774-824.
The sweeping coverage of the decision and its attendant ambiguities prompted Justice
Fortas to characterize the majority opinion as a "complex and necessarily confusing guidebook"
to the duty of fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 203 (1967).
47 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191.
44 See infra note 60.
49 This two-prong approach has been articulated more often by commentators than by
courts. See, e.g., Flynn & Higgins, supra note 8, at 1114; The Collective Bargaining Agreement as a
Limitation on Union Control of Employee Grievances, U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1056 (1970); Lewis, Fair
Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 108 (1967). See also
Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 275-6 (7thCir. 1980) ("[plaintiff] may maintain
an action ... only if he can show both that the underlying grievance was meritorious and that the
union breached its duty of fair representation."); Fizer v. Safeway Stores Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 184
(10th Cir. 1978) ("Plaintiff must clearly show a breach of duty by the Union ... and that his
discharge was wrongful.")
'° Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967).
41 Id. at 210. The majority's use of the word arbitrary is so confusing that there has
been some disagreement as to whether the court even adopted this as a new required element of
the duty of fair representation. Some courts have held that Vaca required nothing more than
honesty and good faith by the union. See infra notes 64-65. This view is supported by statements
in the opinion that "we [do not] see substantial danger to the interests of the individual employee
if his statutory agent is given the contractual power honestly and in good faith to settle grievances
short of arbitration." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967). Statements to the contrary are
overwhelming, however. The majority states in no uncertain terms that "(a) breach of the
statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the
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The second prong of the Vaca test is that the employee's underlying
grievance must be deemed a "meritorious" one for the union to be held liable
for breach of the duty of fair representation. This part of the Vaca test is, to say
the least, much more elusive than the first. It has engendered at least three in-
terpretations. Many courts apply the duty of fair representation and commen-
tators discuss it without mentioning the significance of the merits of the
underlying grievance. 52 Yet to some, proof of a meritorious grievance is half
the task in proving a breach of duty of fair representation. 53 Even then, there
are competing interpretations of the "meritorious" requirement, with some
courts requiring that the grievance ultimately be a winner, and others simply
requiring that it have some merit. Why the discrepancy? The simple explana-
tion is that Vaca contains passages supporting both of the latter two views.
One of the most commonly quoted sentences in Vaca is that a union may
not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion "54
 This statement is the origin of the so-called second prong. While it
seems clear from this statement that the duty of fair representation can only be
breached when the underlying grievance is meritorious," it is not clear what
that should mean when the underlying grievance is of less than obvious merit.
The majority in Vaca seemed to take a very broad approach. They opined
that "in a case such as this," when the grievant supplied evidence supporting
his position, "the union might well have breached its duty had it ignored [the]
complaint or . . . processed it in a perfunctory manner." 56 This sentence is
most troublesome because the Court never had to reach the question whether
the underlying grievance in Vaca was "meritorious." The sentence suggests,
however, that the union owes a duty even when the underlying grievance is not
ultimately deemed meritorious. In fact, in Vaca there was considerable
evidence that the underlying grievance was not a winner." This interpretation
of the meritoriousness requirement is contradicted, however, elsewhere in the
collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190 (emphasis
added).
52 See infra note 60.
53 See supra note 49. While the word "meritorious" has been given more than one
meaning, see infra notes 90-125 and accompanying text, its use in these cases refers only to
grievances that were in fact based on violations of the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g.,
Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 892 (4th Cir. 1980); Fox v. Mitchell
Transp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (D. Md. 1981).
54 Vaca v, Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
" Id. Some courts have avoided the problem of deciding what meritorious means by
applying the duty of fair representation without discussing whether the underlying grievance was
meritorious. See infra note 60. These cases are in direct contradiction to the clear intent of Vaca to
include that term in the doctrine of fair representation and accordingly have been harshly criti-
cized by some commentators. See, e.g., Flynn & Higgins, supra note 8, at 1119.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 194 (1967).
" See generally Feller, supra note 3, at 700. A specialist of the Union's own choosing
agreed that he should not return to work for medical reasons. Moreover, Owens died of the
diagnosed condition during the pendency of this litigation. Id. at 700-01. Even Justice Black,
whose dissent in Vaca was based on a concern that meritorious grievances would be left un-
remedied by the majority's opinion, would only go so far as to say that Owens' grievance was
"not frivolous." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 209.
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opinion." In particular, this interpretation runs afoul of the fault-based
damages concept in Vaca.
Indeed, the strongest case for adherence to the second prong comes from
Vaca's holding that damages can be an appropriate remedy for a breach of the
duty of fair representation so long as they are assessed "according to the
damages caused by the fault of [the employer and the union]."" From this
statement of "fault" principles, it follows that the underlying grievance must
be deemed meritorious before the union can be held liable for breaching the
duty of fair representation. If the underlying grievance is meritorious, then the
grievant clearly was injured and the union's failure to process the claim might
have added to the damages. If the grievance is not meritorious, however, then
it is impossible to award damages consistent with the fault principle.
The ambiguities inherent in Vaca's two-prong test and the controversy
over whether Vaca should be considered a guidebook to all fair representation
cases are manifest in the confused state of the case law. Most courts use an "ar-
bitrariness" test in evaluating union conduct that passes the good faith
hurdle. 6° The cases reveal, however, that a prohibition as open-ended as that
against "arbitrary" action has resulted in tremendous inconsistencies."
5" In discussing damages, for example, the opinion assumes that a union can only be
held liable if there are already damages "attributable solely to the employer's breach of
contract." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 197. Obviously, there must be more than some merit to a
claim before it rises to the level of contractual breach.
59 Id. at 197.
6° There is still disagreement over the significance that should be placed on a union's
motivations in taking the challenged actions. All courts will accept evidence about the union's
motives, but some require evidence of bad faith or hostile motives before finding breach of the
duty. This approach was given significant support by the U.S. Supreme Court when, four years
after Vaca, it decided Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employee v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
The Court, in Lockridge, held that NLRB jurisdiction preempted an employee's suit against his
union for having him discharged. Id. at 301. The suit conceivably could have involved the duty of
fair representation but the Court, in its anxiousness to preserve the preemption doctrine, argued
that such contract claims can usually be separated from fair representation claims which "carry
with [them] the need to adduce substantial evidence of discrimination that it is intentional,
severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives." Id. at 301. The case does not, however,
hold this position consistently. Vaca is quoted at one point for the proposition that a party must
have proved "arbitrary" or "bad faith" conduct on the part of the union to make out a claim. Id.
at.299 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967)).
Most courts and commentators agree that Lockridge does not alter the scope of the duty of
fair representation established in Vara. See, e.g., Beriault v. Local 40 Super Cargoe & Checkers,
501 F.2d 258, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1974); Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 110 (5th Cir.
1973); Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644, 648 (10th Cir. 1973); See also Clark,
supra note 3, at 1124-26 (1973). This view has not been adopted by all courts, however. The
Eighth Circuit has invoked Lockridge on a number of occasions in requiring a finding of racial
discrimination, personal animosity, or hostility based on union activity to support a breach of the
duty. Florey v. Air Line Pilot's Ass'n, 575 F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir. 1978); Anderson v. United
Transp. Union, 557 F.2d 165, 169-70 (8th Cir. 1977). The Seventh Circuit recently followed suit
in Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
6 ' For practically any fact pattern in which fair representation claims arise it is possible
to find a pair of decisions that reach different conclusions as to whether the union's actions were
"arbitrary." In United Steelworkers (Interroyal Corp.), 223 N.L.R.B• 1184, an employee lost
his job as a result of typographical error made on his employment record by a union represent-
ative. Id. The Board deemed the union's actions "arbitrary." However, in Coe v. United Rub-
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Moreover, while many courts examine the merits of the underlying claim
before determining liability, 62 others have not followed this formulation of fair
representation law.° Many courts have been reluctant to rely entirely on fault
principles. Sometimes damages are awarded in cases in which the union is
deemed to have acted "arbitrarily" with regard to a grievance that was not
meritorious." At other times, the "requirement" that the underlying griev-
ance be a meritorious one has been either twisted or overlooked. 66
ber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978), the typographical error
that rendered a union appeal of the employee's grievance untimely was considered "nonar-
bitrary." Id, at 1350-51. In NLRB v. Gen. Truck Drivers, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976), the
union's decision to leave the status of a seniority grievance to the vote of the membership was
deemed "arbitrary." Id. at 1176. However, in Steelworkers Local 7748 (Eaton Corp.), 102
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1141 (1979), a similar decision was deemed by the Board to be `not
arbitrary." Id. at 1143. In Fox v. Mitchell Transp. Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Md. 1981), the
union was deemed not to have breached the duty of fair representation by merely representing
three employees asserting seniority rights contrary to the plaintiff. Id. at 1153-54. However, in
Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1232, 1237 (8th Cir. 1980), the union was held in
breach for representing four employees asserting seniority rights contrary to the two plaintiffs. In
Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 1975), the union was held in breach of the duty of
fair representation for failing to represent an employee who the company could, under the terms
of the collective agreement, legally discharge. However, in Buchanan v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 388,
394 (4th Cir. 1979), the union was deemed not to have breached the duty of fair representation
when it refused to insist that an employee be reinstated pending arbitration, even though that
right was contained in the collective agreement. In Service Employees Local 579 (Convacare of
Decatur), 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 695 (1977), the union was held in breach of the duty of fair
representation for failing to seek out the grievant's version of the story. However, in Printing &
Graphic Communications Local 4 (S.F. Newspaper Printing Co.), 104 L.R.R. M. (BNA) 1050,
1052 (1980), the union was not held in breach for failing to obtain the discharged employee's ver-
sion of the incident.
" See, e.g., Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 184 (10th Cir. 1978).
65 See, e.g., Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978)
(discussed in text accompanying notes 12-13 supra). A more incredible result was reached in
Kaiser v. Local No. 83, with the Ninth Circuit holding that a valid cause of action against a
union may exist even though "plaintiff admitted that his discharge was not based on any of the
improper grounds contained in the collective bargaining agreement." Kaiser v. Local No. 83,
577 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1978).
64 If this situation is difficult to imagine, consider the possibility of deciding a case by
the flip of a coin, or by a vote of the union membership, or for purely political reasons. See generally
R. JAMES & E. JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS 167-85 (1965) (political use of grievance
mechanism).
65 In Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), and in Bazarte v. United Transp.
Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970) the courts assessed damages against the union for breaching
the duty of fair representation without ever addressing the question whether the underlying
grievances were meritorious. In Local 26, Am. Newspaper Guild (Buffalo Courrier-Express,
Inc.), 220 N.L.R.B. 79 (1975), the Board went so far as to say that "it is not the function of the
Board to decide the merits of a grievance." Instead, and without further explanation, the Board
decided that it was sufficient in duty of fair representation cases to determine simply whether the
underlying grievance was not "clearly frivolous." Id. Accord Service Employees Local 579 (Con-
vacate of Decatur), 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 696 (1977). In many cases, the Board has simply as-
sumed that the grievance would have been found meritorious and awarded damages accordingly.
See, e.g., P.P.G. Industries Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 713, 717 (1977); Local 485, Elec. Radio & Mach.
Workers (Automative Plating Corp.) 183 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1970). As one commentator put it,
this result "would seem [to violate] the principles of apportionment in [ Vaca]." Comment, Unfair
Representation and the National Labor Relations Board: A Functional Analysis, 37 J. AIR L. & Comm. 89,
106 (1971).
There are, of course, cases that accurately reflect the apparent intent of Vaca to restrict
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II. THE PERFUNCTORY PROCESSING CASES
Some of the inconsistencies in the case law may simply reflect the dif-
ficulties inherent in developing standards for regulating decisionmaking
processes. Thus, it may be inevitable, as Professor David Feller has argued,
that the scope of the duty of fair representation remains somewhat ill-defined 66
and, by extension, somewhat inconsistent. This is a strong argument insofar as
it relates to the kind of fair representation case which Vaca can be viewed as
typifying: cases challenging the reasoning or motive of the union in determin-
ing whether to press a grievance. 67
This is not, however, the only kind of fair representation case brought in
the context of grievance administration. There are cases that do not involve the
union's reasoning or motives at all. Instead, they challenge the union's
processing (or lack thereof). These are the "perfunctory processing" cases. In
some of these cases, the duty of fair representation has been applied so that it
covers certain unintentional acts of union officials." In other cases, the duty
has been used to impose liability on the union when the court determines that
the union's procedures lacked "fairness."" The old yardsticks of union
behavior, namely good faith and non-arbitrariness, are referred to in these
cases. These terms, however, have been applied in such an inconsisent manner
that they have lost any unified meaning or purpose."
the union's liability to cases in which (1) the underlying claim is meritorious and (2) the union
added to the grievant's damages. See supra note 49. Still, even among those cases purporting to
apply Vaca, there is an obvious reluctance to allow the union to escape liability in every case in
which the underlying grievance was not meritorious. The suggestion was made in Kaiser v.
Local 83, for example, that even though the employee could not recover from his employer, this
did not imply that he did not have "a valid cause of action against his union." Kaiser v. Local
83, 577 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1978). Similarly, in Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., the court
hinted that the union might be liable even if the grievance were found to be without merit.
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 315 n.7 (6th Cir. 1975). A less onerous ap-
proach to punishing unions that act arbitrarily in regard to a non-meritorious grievance is to
award nominal damages and costs. See, e.g., Alexander v. International Union of Operating
Eng., 624 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir. 1980).
66 See Feller, supra note 3, at 812.
67 See, e.g., Atwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 657 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1981). There is
evidence from the administrative law context that it is difficult, if not impossible, to devise a
substantive standard for reviewing decisionmaking that yields consistent results. Standards for
review based on such concepts as "arbitrariness" or "reasonableness" ultimately raise the same
question: was there an acceptable or legitimate link between a decision and the ostensible reason
for taking it? Of course, few, if any, decisions are ever truly "arbitrary" — that is, made without
any principle or reason. Thus, unless this type of review is applied so that virtually every decision
is upheld, its scope will depend on subjective factors that are bound to yield unpredictable results.
Should it be considered legitimate for a union to choose to abandon one grievance in ex-
change for concessions on another? There is no principled way to make such a determination
based on anything other than one's assessment of the individual merits and of the balance that
should obtain between workers, unions and employees. Saying that the union must not act "ar-
bitrarily" adds nothing to this inquiry. See, e.g., ILWU, Local 13 v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441
F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1971), cm. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). See also Clark, supra note 3, at
1174-77.
68 See infra text accompanying notes 151-53.
69 See infra text accompanying notes 167-69.
70 See supra note 61.
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The second prong of Vaca is also most often twisted or overlooked in the
perfunctory processing cases. This is because the varying interpretations of the
"requirement" that the underlying grievance be meritorious reflect a deeper
ambivalence about the extent to which Vaca should be considered the founda-
tion of all fair representation cases. Vaca involved a rather narrow issue. The
court had to decide whether a judicial determination that an underlying
grievance was meritorious was sufficient to support a claim against the union
for not taking the grievance all the way to arbitration. Yet, the decision con-
tains general statements that led Justice Fortas to characterize it as a "confus-
ing guidebook" to the duty of fair representation.n It is open to question,
however, whether Vaca really is, or should be, considered a "guidebook" to all
fair representation cases. Arguably, the second pi-ong should apply only when
the grievant is challenging the union's decision on the merits. Vaca might also
be limited to cases in which the union has taken the grievance through all steps
of the grievance procedure but arbitration.
Nevertheless, virtually all fair representation cases routinely invoke
general statements from Vaca, even while reaching results that appear to break
away from its rationale. These cases demand a better explanation than the ex-
planation offered by those who claim that the duty of fair representation must
always remain somewhat vague and undefined. In fact, the inconsistencies
both in the case law and in the commentary can be explained by the failure to
recognize that Vaca is not the only kind of fair representation case brought in
the context of grievance administration. Vaca did much more than simply add
the concept of arbitrariness to the scope of the duty of fair representation. It
opened the door to an entirely new type of fair representation case. Specifical-
ly, the majority in Vaca "acceptfed] the proposition that a union may not ar-
bitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion.'" 2 This statement added yet another word, perfunctory, to a list of
ambiguous words that already cluttered the fair representation cases." Like
certain phrases in Steele" and Humphrey," this language in Vaca had the poten-
tial for stretching the duty of fair representation well beyond its apparent
scope.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 203 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
" Id. at 191.
" There has been an irrepressible tendency in the case law to add both new terms and
new qualifications to those words already used to describe the duty of fair representation. See,
e.g., International Chem. Workers Local 190 (FMC Corp.), 251 N.L.R.B. 1535, 1544 (1981)
("cavalier, perfunctory handling"); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 315 (6th
Cir. 1975) (McCree, J., concurring) ("capricious" and "superficial" processing). See also Truck
Driver's Local 692, 209 N.L.R.B. 446, 450 (1974) (Fanning, Member, concurring). Member
Fanning expressed, in his concurring opinion, frustration with the increasing reliance on "terms
such as 'irrelevant,' 'unfair,' and 'invidious' [which] cannot be helpful in deciding what the law
permits and what it prohibits." Id.
74 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) ("without hostile
discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith").
75 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964) ("wholly relevant considerations,
not ... capricious or arbitrary").
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That potential was soon realized. From this ambiguous language in Vaca
came the "perfunctory processing" cases. Unfortunately, there seems to be lit-
tle recognition of the fact that these cases exist as a distinct subset of fair
representation claims." Instead, the term "perfunctory" has been treated as
just another word in the vocabulary routinely used by courts in fair representa-
tion decisions, and these cases are considered in the same class as the tradi•-
tional challenges to union reasoning.
These cases, however, are different. The perfunctory processing cases
have nothing to do with union reasoning or union motivations. Instead, they
challenge the union's processing. In many cases, the crux of the challenge is
that the union made no decision." Sometimes this seems to be due to an in-
advertent act or omission, while other times it appears to be a conscious but
misguided decision. Both of the examples in the introduction to this article
were perfunctory processing cases.
The perfunctory processing cases contain very similar fact patterns. In
most of the cases, an employee challenges a union's handling one or more of
the following steps of grievance administration: (1) filing the proper papers in a
timely fashion, (2) notifying the grievant of certain information during the
process, (3) investigating the allegations, and (4) representing the grievant
before the proper body. The claims against the union in these situations seem
quite similar. The union forgets to mail the grievant notice that her claim has
been dropped." A typographical error results in the rejection of a claim as un-
timely." The shop steward handling a grievance neglects to interview a witness
to the incident at issue." A cursory reading of the collective bargaining agree-
ment leads the union representative to assert a faulty argument or to overlook a
good one." It should not be surprising that cases of this nature abound in both
the federal reporters and on the docket of the NLRB" because the union
representative handling grievances is usually overworked, underpaid and faced
with many politically sensitive issues." Nor is it surprising that cases of this
76 Note, IBEW v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the Duty of Fair Representation, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 1041 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Hint of Negligence]. The author separated the cases
into categories of conduct, with "procedural" errors constituting one of the categories. He con-
sidered these cases, however, to fall within the "vague contours of Vaca." Id. at 1064, 1066.
Clark, supra note 3, at 1137, considered an inquiry into the union's procedures to constitute a
"type of analysis" to be used in determining whether the actions were rational.
" See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
78 See, e.g., Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir.
1978).
79 See, e.g., Coe v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers, 571 F.2d
1349, 1350 (5th Cir. 1978).
DO See, e.g., Service Employees Local 579 (Convacare of Decatur), 229 N.L.R.B. 692,
694 (1977).
See, e.g., Denver Stereotypers v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 134, 137 (10th Cir. 1980).
" According to a draft report of the ABA's Section on Labor and Employment Law,
there were 388 opinions reported by the BNA between 1976 and 1981 in which a breach of the
duty of fair representation was alleged. Undoubtedly, the total volume of litigation is much
larger. See DRAFTS, supra note 34.
83 J. KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT: THE POWER OF INDUSTRIAL
GROUPS 15-18, 44-49 (1961).
December 1982] 	 COMPETING MODELS	 17
nature have become questions of fair representation given the language in
Vaca.
More surprising, however, is the scant attention which the phrase "per-
functory processing" has received. The phrase itself can easily be considered to
hold the answer to two important questions left unanswered by Vaca. First, how
much discretion does the union have in processing and settling grievances?
Vaca held that a union's discretionary power to supervise the grievance
machinery includes the authority to settle grievances short of arbitration even if
a reviewing court might later find that the grievance was "meritorious." 84 This
power is limited, however, by the prohibition against "arbitrary" or "perfunc-
tory" actions. The manner in .which courts are to apply these general labels for
characterizing union behavior is not obvious. It is unclear whether the union
must always have a reason for taking the challenged action in order to avoid a
finding that it has acted arbitrarily. Additionally, it is unclear whether a find-
ing of arbitrariness is possible only in those cases in which a decision on the
merits has been reached. The Vaca decision did not clearly state whether the
standards for reviewing the union's actions were subjective or objective. While
the opinion does not suggest that objective standards should be used, neither
does it eliminate the possibility. 85
Also left unclear by Vaca is the relationship between the standards of union
behavior and the significance of the merits of the underlying grievance." Must
the underlying grievance always be deemed a meritorious one in order to hold
the union liable or can a union's actions be "arbitrary" enough to constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation even if the underlying grievance is not
meritorious?" While the fault-based compensation principle in Vaca88 supports
an argument for a meritorious grievance requirement, even the Vaca opinion
indicated a concern that grievances with some merit be accorded certain protec-
tions. 89
 The question is of tremendous import since grievances do not fall con-
veniently into the categories of "meritorious" and "frivolous. " 90 A vast ma-
jority of the cases that reach the courts are in the middle of the spectrum, where
a rule is hard to apply but of great necessity. Herein lies the problem of the
somewhat meritorious grievance." Has the union breached its duty of fair
84 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
85 Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SUP. CT. REV.
81, 107 (1967).
86 See supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
" See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967).
68 Id.
89 See infra text accompanying notes 170-73.
9° Commentators have been strangely reluctant to address this problem directly. Clark,
for example, argued that "the union should have to offer stronger reasons when it refuses clearly
meritorious grievance." Clark, supra note 3, at 116. Similarly, Feller has argued that it is clear
that a union cannot abandon a "justified grievance" in return for an agreement that other
workers will be given a pay raise. Feller, supra note 3, at 812. It seems, however, that these
statements border on the obvious. Unfortunately, it is equally obvious from the fair representa-
tion cases that the "clearly meritorious" and "justified" grievance is a rare creature. Quite
simply, the fair representation doctrine raises the most difficult problems when the grievance is
not clearly meritorious or justified.
91
 The validity of the somewhat meritorious grievance often turns on questions of
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representation if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably in relation to a grievance
and the merits of which are unclear?
The phrase "perfunctory processing" does not offer clear answers to these
questions. It does, however, offer the proverbial hook on which to hang one's
hat. Actually, it provides more than one hook. 92 Some courts have emphasized
the word "perfunctory," which leads them into a flexible, case-by-case evalua-
tion of union behavior that borders on the concept of negligence. This inquiry
is generally consistent with fault principles and the remedies provided usually
depend on the merits of the underlying grievance. Other courts have apparent-
ly placed more emphasis on the word "processing," writing opinions that lean
toward the use of objective criteria for evaluating union procedures without
regard for the merits of the underlying grievance. These decisions stress the
need for certain absolute procedural protections in grievance administration. 93
This split in the courts reflects more than just the juxtaposition of two
words. The split reflects the disagreement over whether Vaca should be the
"guidebook" to all fair representation cases. Those courts which defer to Vaca
consider the duty of fair representation to be founded in fault principles and
based upon case-by-case determinations, whether the plaintiff is challenging a
union decision or simply an omission of some sort. Those courts which favor a
different approach view the problems in the perfunctory processing cases as dif-
ferent from the problems present in Vaca. In the view of these courts, the per-
functory processing cases are evidence of the need for basic procedural protec-
tions that were never at issue in Vaca. Unfortunately, these two viewpoints
have not been expressed clearly or distinctly. A brief examination of two of the
better known perfunctory processing cases illustrates the pressing need for such
clarification.
Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co." is, in parts, an example of the process-
based approach to these cases. 95 In Smith, the plaintiffs challenged actions
veracity or conflicting expert testimony. In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., for example,
the company discharged the plaintiffs for alleged "dishonesty." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 557 (1976). The company asserted that the plaintiffs had sought reimburse-
ment for motel expense in excess of actual charges. The company presented the motel receipts as
evidence. Plaintiffs alleged that the motel clerk recorded less on the receipts than was actually
paid, "retaining for himself the difference between the amount receipted and the amount re-
corded. "Id.
Similarly, in Minnis v. United Auto Workers, the plaintiff was discharged for having
falsified a medical form. Minnis v. United Auto Workers, 531 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1975).
The attending physician denied making the alleged changes on the medical form, but a nurse
testified that she, not the plaintiff, made the changes at the request of the doctor. See also Wyatt v.
Interstate & Ocean Transport Co., 623 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1980) (conflicting testimony of doc-
tors).
92 In the effort to lend meaning to this word some have resorted to dictionary defini-
tions. Not surprisingly, this effort has yielded minimal results. See, e.g., Ethier v. United States
Postal Service, 590 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1979).
" See infra text accompanying notes 166-72.
94 619 F.2d 1229, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
95 Actually the opinion seems to employ both approaches to the perfunctory processing
cases. It uses the case-by-case approach in deciding one issue. See infra text accompanying note
103. The case is noteworthy, however, for its use of a due process approach to the other issue. See
infra text accompanying notes 104-08.
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taken by their union in resolving a seniority dispute. The case arose when the
employer exercised its prerogative under a modified security clause to fill two
new positions on the basis of "superior skill and ability" instead of straight
seniority. 96 The union subsequently processed grievances filed by unsuccessful
applicants who had greater seniority than the two men chosen by the company.
These grievances were processed through the five-step grievance procedure to
arbitration where the arbitrator decided that two of the unsuccessful applicants
should be promoted." The award appeared to grant these promotions without
ordering that any other employees be demoted. This result was beyond the
authority of the arbitrator and, in addition, the arbitration decision contained
some technical errors. The anion sought "clarification" of the award." A
meeting between the union, the company and the arbitrator resulted in the
demotion of the two employees chosen by the company in the first place." The
demoted employees were not notified of the meeting.'" They subsequently
filed grievances that the union refused to process.'" The demoted employees
then filed suit in federal court against the union for violating the duty of fair
representation in the handling of their grievances. The employees alleged that
(1) the union did not properly investigate the issues before deciding to side with
the workers that had the greatest seniority, and (2) the union failed to notify
them of the meeting with the arbitrator.
Smith is a classic perfunctory processing case. The case did not involve a
challenge of the union's ultimate decision to process the grievances based solely
on seniority, rather it involved a challenge of the "perfunctory dismissal" of
the plaintiffs' claims and the failure to notify them of a key hearing date. In
other words, the challenge was based on process, not substance.'"
The decision in Smith is also characteristic of many perfunctory processing
cases: it is vague and confusing. The court seemed to apply different theories of
fair representation to the notice and investigation claims. The court, without
adopting a per se rule, held that failure to notify the plaintiffs of the arbitration
hearing constituted a violation of the duty of fair representation. It seemed to
say that such an omission on the union's part constitutes a breach of the duty of
fair representation only if the employee is "prejudiced by not having
notice.'"" This assertion is consistent, of course, with Vaca's purported second
prong, the "requirement" of a meritorious claim.
The court's resolution of the other issue — challenging the union's deci-
sion to go forward with grievances filed by the most senior applicants — was
96 Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., at 1233.
97 Id. at 1234.
98 Id.
99 Id.
ma Id.
1 °' Id.
1 " Id. at 1234-35. The case involved another important issue that will not be considered
in detail here because it involved a peripheral issue: when, if ever, can a union defend a fair
representation claim by alleging that a given employee was "represented" by the employer? Id.
at 1229, 1242.
1 " Id. at 1241.
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completely different. In this portion of the opinion the court concluded, with
almost no analysis, that the union had violated the duty of fair representation.
The court simply termed the union's decision to side with the senior-most
employees as "perfunctory" 1 " and noted that the union's review of the plain-
tiffs' skills and ability was "superficial." 105 The court concluded that the union
did not insure a "fair" resolution of the dispute.'" The dissent surmised that
under the majority opinion a union violates the duty of fair representation
whenever it takes an internal position without conducting trial-like hearings.'"
The majority opinion could be read to reach an even more outrageous result:
that the union can never side with either party in a seniority suit without
violating the duty of fair representation because taking sides in such disputes
necessarily involves the subordination of certain claims.' 08
Most courts have shied away from an interpretation of perfunctory
processing that is process-based. Courts avoiding a process analysis utilize a
comparative, case-by-case evaluation of union decisionmaking. The scope of
this evaluation is less than clear, but courts refer to such factors as the "skill of
the actors" involved' 08 and the "prevailing practice" of the union."° In prac-
tical terms, however, these factors leave courts with nothing more than the
yardsticks of "reasonableness" and "arbitrariness", in those cases in which
bad faith is not an issue. The result of this situation is that many courts end
up asking whether "negligence" is "arbitrary" or "unfairness" is "per-
functory.'" That this situation is regrettable is best evidenced by the
disparate results obtained from this endeavor. 112
This line of cases is typified by the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ruzicka v.
General Motors Corp.'" The union in Ruzicka failed to file the statement required
by the collective bargaining agreement in order to invoke arbitration of the
plaintiff's grievance. " 1 The union did, however, file the necessary notice of ar-
IG4 Id. at 1239.
'" Id. at 1240.
' 06 Id.
'" Id. at 1247-53 (Henry, J., dissenting).
in The majority stressed that "[t]he union is the agent of all employees in the union,"
and claimed that the union in this case "not only abandoned the plaintiffs but took an adversary
attitude toward them ..." Id. at 1239. How a union could avoid this "adversary attitude" in a
seniority dispute — where any position will, by definition, be adverse to some members — was
never explained.
Fortunately, other courts faced with seniority disputes have taken a more realistic ap-
proach, allowing the union discretion to decide which employees to represent. See, e.g., Fox v.
Mitchell Transp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Md. 1981).
109 Denver Stereotypers Local 13 v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1980).
110 Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1981).
"' See, e.g., ITT Arctic Serv. Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 116, 116 n.1 (1978) (union actions
"not merely perfunctory" but "in fact arbitrary"); Service Employee Local 579 (Convacare of
Decatur), 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 695 (1977) ("there comes a point" where negligence is arbitrary);
Truck Drivers Local 692 (Great Western Unifreight), 209 N.L.R.B. 446, 447-48 (1974)
("negligence" is not "arbitrary").
" 2 See supra note 43. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967).
" 3 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981).
" 4 Id. at 1208. Ruzicka was discharged for being intoxicated on the job and for using
threatening and abusive language toward his superiors at work. Id. His grievance did not dispute
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bitration and twice received an extension for filing the accompanying state-
ment. " 5 The union offered no explanation for its failure to file the statement. " 6
In Ruzicka I the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's finding that there
was no breach of the duty of fair representation, holding that "such negligent
handling of the grievance, unrelated as it was to the merits of the [employee's]
case, amounts to unfair representation."'"
The holding of the Sixth Circuit was unclear for many reasons. First,
although the court applied an arbitrariness standard it never came to grips with
what the term "arbitrariness" would mean. Second, a concurring opinion sug-
gested that only "gross negligence" would amount to a breach of the duty."g
Finally, whatever clarity this case may have added to the content of the duty of
fair representation was more than lost when one considers the problem of
remedies. The case seems to adopt a tort approach in the very same sentence
that it rejects a fundamental element of tort law, namely, provable damages. 19
Matters were confused further after the District Court decided on remand
that the union's "malfeasance amounted to unfair representation. '"" The
Sixth Circuit reversed that decision as well, holding, in Ruzicka II,'" that the
District Court should have considered evidence concerning the "past prevail-
ing practice" of the union." 2 In other words, the Sixth Circuit apparently
added an affirmative defense akin to "industry custom" 123 to its already
unclear negligence test. The controversy surrounding that doctrine in tort law
may well manifest itself as Ruzicka III.
Ruzicka and Smith are both part of a new and largely unrecognized area of
fair representation law. These cases attempt to address some important ques-
tions left unanswered by Vaca, Although they invoke similar words and arise
the facts, but alleged that the discharge was "unduly harsh." Id. See generally Morgan, Fair is Foul,
and Foul is Fair — Ruzicka and the Duty of Fair Representation in the Circuit Courts, 11 TOL. L. REV. 335
(1980).
1 " Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d at 1208.
Id.
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975).
" 6 Id. at 315-16 (McCree J., concurring). The absurd results that can obtain from this
effort to distinguish between "types" of negligence are best illustrated by the statement in Seeley
v. General Motors Corp., 526 F. Sum), 542, 545 (E.D. Mich. 1981) that union liability attaches
"somewhere between negligence and gross negligence — but closer to gross negligence than to
negligence." Id.
1 " The court said that "[s]uch negligent handling of the grievance, unrelated as it was
to the merits of [the] case, amounts to unfair representation." Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.,
523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975). It is difficult to be sure of what the court meant by its reference
to the merits. Is negligent handling permissible if it is related to the merits? It would seem that
negligent handling would always, by definition, have to be "unrelated" to the merits since a
"relationship" with the merits would require something more than unintentional acts associated
with negligent behavior. The court's failure to clarify the significance of the underlying merits is
more troublesome, however, when the issue of remedies is considered. The court never discussed
the implications of the fact that Ruzicka admitted that the reasons for this discharge were true.
They obviously considered this fact unimportant, hinting in a footnote that the union might be
liable even if the grievance were ultimately deemed nonmeritorious. Id. at 315 n.7.
1 " 649 F.2d 1207, 1209 (6th Cir. 1981).
' 2 ' Id. at 1211.
122 Id.
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from similar fact patterns, they reach widely differing results. Many of the per-
functory processing cases are much harder to explain, or even understand,
than Ruzicka and Smith.'" The NLRB General Counsel, in an unusual move,
and partly in response to the confused state of the case law,' 25 issued a
memorandum attempting to clarify the Board's policy on the duty of fair
representation.' 26
 Even that memo is largely unhelpful, however, because it
fails to recognize that from the words "perfunctory processing" have come two
different approaches to the same problem. These two approaches are so fun-
damentally different that the case law will not be consistent until these dif-
ferences are recognized and addressed.
III. MODELS OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The perfunctory processing cases display widely differing answers to two
important questions. The first question is how one determines whether a
'" As Prosser noted, if an actor "does only what everyone else has done, there is at least
an inference that he is conforming to the community's idea of reasonable behavior." W. PROS-
SER, LAW OF TORTS S 33, at 166 (4th ed. 1971). The reference to this concept in Ruzicka is con-
fusing for two reasons. First, it seemed to refer only to this union's past conduct. In traditional
tort law, however, such evidence "is commonly called 'habit' rather than custom [and] is not
evidence of any standard of reasonable care .... " Id. at 168. Second, there are exceptions in
traditional tort law for a variety of professional activities. Id. at 165. Whether union officials,
whose role is similar to an attorney's, should be granted this leeway is not clear.
124
 In Griffin v. UAW, for example, the plaintiff was discharged by a depot manager
after he injured the warehouse manager in a fight at a local hockey game. Griffin v. UAW, 469
F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972). Plaintiff alleged that the union breached its duty by filing his subse-
quent grievance with the warehouse manager whom he had assaulted. Id. at 182. The only other
person with whom the grievance could have been filed, however, was the depot manager who had
fired him in the first place. Id. at 184. Nevertheless, the court decided that the union acted "ar-
bitrarily," without satisfactorily explaining how the union could have avoided the problem. Id.
In an unpersuasive passage, the court suggested that the filing of the grievance with the depot
manager, who actually discharged the aggrieved employee, would have been permissible because
he was not as "high tempered" as the warehouse manager. Id. at 184-85. The court dismissed as
irrelevant the fact that the depot manager actually refused the grievance after it was reinstated.
Id. at 185.
The problem of reaching a result without an adequate explanation is best illustrated in
Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., one of the cases discussed in the introduction to this ar-
ticle. Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978). In Robesky, the
plaintiff claimed that she turned down the company's final settlement offer because she believed
that the union would still take her grievance to arbitration. Id. at 1085-87. The alleged violation
of the duty of fair representation was in failing to notify the plaintiff that the union had agreed to
the settlement that was later offered to the plaintiff. Id. If the reasoning of the court was clear in
the case •— for example, if the court had required notice of settlement agreements — then the
decision might have served as a guide for union behavior in similar circumstances. In finding the
union in breach of the duty of fair representation, the court tossed in so many amorphous
abstractions as to make any understanding of their rationale quite unlikely. In the court's words:
"Acts of omission by union officials not intended to harm members may be so egregious, so far
short of minimum standards of fairness to the employee, and so unrelated to legitimate union in-
terests as to be arbitrary." Id. at 1090. The court noted that a trier of fact reasonably could con-
clude that all three of these "elements" were present in this case without specifying how to iden-
tify their presence or whether any combination less than three would suffice. Id. at 1090-91.
122
 The memo could be interpreted as a direct response to Robesky because that is the on-
ly case cited in the memo. See NLRB memo, supra note 6. For a discussion of Robesky, see supra
note 124.
126 See NLRB memo, supra note 6. For a discussion of the unusual nature of this memo,
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union's actions are in breach of the duty of fair representation. While the cases
employ the same labels to characterize union actions, courts rely on different
approaches in analyzing them. Many courts examine the union's behavior on a
case-by-case basis, evaluating in light of what appears reasonable under the
circumstances other courts seem to require certain procedural safeguards
regardless of the circumstances. The second question is whether the underlying
grievance must be meritorious before a union will be held liable for breach of
duty of fair representation. Again, a full spectrum of answers have been sug-
gested. Some courts consider meritoriousness a prerequisite to recovery, but
vary in their views of what constitutes a meritorious grievance. Mer-
itoriousness is construed narrowly by some courts; that is, only those
grievances found to have actual merit are considered meritorious. Other courts
which view meritoriousness as a prerequisite to recovery have adopted a more
liberal construction. These courts are willing to consider any grievance with
some merit to the meritorious. Still others apparently think that merit is irrele-
vant. Unfortunately, few cases directly address these questions, and even fewer
recognize the relationship between them. 127
These important questions can be answered in two consistent ways. These
approaches are based upon very different assumptions about the purpose of the
duty of fair representation. The approaches should, if applied consistently,
often lead to different outcomes. Regrettably, these approaches have not been
clearly defined or applied. 128 Rather, they have been mixed together in-
discriminately, often in different portions of the same opinion. These theories
of fair representation are distinct, however, and must be separated in order to
understand the current confusion in the case law.
A. The Tort-Compensation Model
One theory of the perfunctory processing cases is based on concepts that
appear in tort law. The union's actions are evaluated in the context of what
other unions might do under the circumstances. So long as the union's
behavior is deemed reasonable, there is no breach of the duty. Reasonableness
is not, however, confined in application to those cases in which the unions' acts
were intentional. As in the general tort law, there is no requirement of specific
intent, just volitional activity. So the reasonableness standard can be applied to
inadvertent acts and intentional acts alike. 129
 Nor is reasonableness ascertained
see Peck, The Administrative Procedure Act and the NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum on Fair
Representation Cases: Invalid Rulemaking?, 31 LAB. L.J. 76 (1980).
127 See generally cases cited supra note 60.
128 The main contention of this article is that there are two models of fair representation
that explain the perfunctory processing cases. These models are separate and must be
distinguished. They are not, however, explicitly stated in the cases. Nor are they necessarily
mutually exclusive. Conceivably, for example, the tort-compensation principles could be applied
in certain types of cases, and due process-regulation concepts in others. The models set forth in
this article, however, are speculative. It would be premature to start suggesting various combina-
tions and permutations of these models before the models themselves are scrutinized. So for the
purpose of this article, the two models are examined separately, keeping in mind the possibility
that they might be useful together.
128 See, e.g., Baldini v. Local Union No. 1095, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978); Hughes v.
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by reference to any fixed standards or expectations of what procedures a union
should provide. Thus, whether a union's failure to notify a grievant of the
specific terms of a settlement agreement constitutes a violation of the duty of
fair representation depends on a variety of factors, including the past practice
of the union, the practice of other unions and the specific facts of the case.
Ordinary negligence concepts, often suggested by commentators as an im-
provement in the duty of fair representation, fit this part of the tort-
compensation model well. There are, however, an array of possibilities along
the spectrum of negligence. Consistent with this model of fair representation
the union could, for example, be held to a gross negligence standard.' 3° The
difference in these possible standards implies correspondingly different bal-
ances between the relative strength of unions and employees. The difference
has been discussed extensively in the literature with a strong consensus that or-
dinary negligence standards should prevail.' 3 ' The different possible types of
negligence are important to consider, but are not nearly as significant in shap-
ing the duty of fair representation as the interpretation of the word "mer-
itorious." That subject has received practically no attention, however, in the
commentary. 132
The question of how to evaluate the merits of the underlying grievance
cannot, however, be avoided entirely because the tort-compensation model re-
quires an implicit, if not an explicit, consideration of the merits. The tradi-
tional fair representation suit is basically based, of course, on the claim that the
merits of the underlying grievance are stronger than the union's reasons for not
pursuing it further. The tort-compensation model simply extends that notion to
cases in which the union's procedures, rather than its decision, are at issue. But
even if the court does not consider the merits of the underlying grievance ex-
plicitly, they are considered indirectly. In deciding, for example, whether a
union breached its duty by misinterpreting the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the court looks to what a reasonable union official would do under the
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 683, 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Wyatt v. In-
terstate Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1980) ("To sustain a member's action
against his union ... it is not necessary that the union's breach be intentional.")
"° This approach was suggested by Judge McCree's concurring opinion in Ruzicka v.
General Motors, 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975). See supra note 118. It was also suggested by
the NLRB General Counsel in a memorandum on the duty of fair representation. See NLRB
memo, supra note 6. See also Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1090 (9th
Cir. 1978) ("egregious" behavior, "reckless disregard").
'" See infra note 144.
"2 Typical of the treatment of this problem is Clark, supra note 3, at 1139: "Neither of
these prohibitions — whim or improper motive — requires a court to decide:whether the union
made the right decision. In cases that lie between the poles, however, courts may have to consider
the merits." Id. Similarly, Feller, supra note 3, at 811, wrote that a court should not review the
action on the basis of its view of the merits of the underlying grievance unless "it finds that the
action was ... patently unreasonable."
Both of-these statements are exceedingly vague as to the extent to which courts should
scrutinize the underlying grievance. While both commentators seem to prefer no judicial review
of the merits, they argue for it in certain "obvious" cases. Whether such cases can be easily iden-
tified or agreed upon, however, is doubtful. See supra note 91.
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circumstances.'" One of the circumstances, possibly the most important one,
is the merits of the underlying grievance.
A reasonable union obviously decides which grievances to advance largely
on the basis of their merit. While some meritorious grievances may be
overlooked in the process — a key reason why the duty of fair representation
exists — it is unlikely that unions pursue many non-meritorious grievances, ex-
cept possibly for fear of being held in breach of the duty of fair representation.
Since a major goal of fair representation law is to allow unions to avoid process-
ing frivolous grievances without incurring liability, 134 a court would not find
under the tort-compensation approach that a union had breached the duty of
fair representation unless the underlying grievance had at least some merit.
There is, of course, a marked difference between a meritorious grievance
— one adjudged to be correct on the facts — and a grievance that has some
merit.'" Presumably, any case that results in litigation involves a grievance
that has some merit. Proving that a grievance should be deemed meritorious is
much more difficult. Whether union liability should depend on the existence of
a truly meritorious grievance depends on how one views the larger philosophy
of fair representation law. The merits of the underlying grievance are extreme-
ly important if the purpose of the duty of fair representation is to compensate
individuals for damages caused by employer breaches of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Thus under the tort-compensation model, plaintiffs recover
damages only if their underlying claim is meritorious.
The tort-compensation model is, in short, a coherent approach for resolv-
ing the perfunctory processing cases. The rights of individuals are defined,
under this model, by a standard of union behavior based on the behavior of
other unions in similar circumstances and by reference to the merits of the
underlying grievance. Thus, a union is not considered in breach of the duty of
fair representation unless its behavior is deemed to have been, say,
negligent. 136 Even then, the union will incur liability only if it has contributed
to damages as defined by the collective bargaining agreement, 137 a result which
will occur only if the underlying grievance is meritorious. This model of fair
representation appears quite similar to the two-prong test attributed to Vaca.
Under Vaces two prongs, a union would incur liability only if, first, its conduct
was arbitrary or in bad faith, and, second, the employee's underlying griev-
ance was meritorious.'" The tort-compensation model differs from Vaca,
'" See, e.g., Denver Stereotypers & Electrotypers Union v. N.L.R.B., 623 F.2d 134,
137 (10th Cir. 1980).
"4 For a discussion of the union control theory, see supra note 1. See also Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
135 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
196 Ordinary negligence need not be the standard that is relied upon. Variations of this
standard have been suggested in many cases. There are so many possibilities that courts agreeing
on a "subjective" approach cannot agree on its substance. See supra note 118 and accompanying
text.
13 ' This is the second prong of the two-prong test often attributed to Vaca. See supra note
53-58 & 60 and accompanying text.
196 For a discussion of the two-prong test attributed to Vaca, see supra text accompanying
notes 49-59.
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however, in that the former explicitly incorporates the comparative approach
into the first prong. The tort-compensation approach looks beyond the union's
reasoning, allowing for a finding of breach even in cases of inadvertent acts or
omissions. Rather than trying to limit the first prong to intentional acts —
something that many courts have done without a principled explanation — this
model extends the reasonableness approach to include other situations. In
short, it keeps the conventional interpretation of Vaca, but removes limitations
that appear inconsistent with that approach. Since compensation is the over-
riding goal of this model, punitive damages are not allowed even if the union
acts in bad faith. This too is consistent with existing doctrine. 139 Essentially,
the duty of fair representation plays a "unique and subordinate role" which
facilitates section 301 suits against employers."° It has no role or content of its
own other than as a mechanism for proceeding against an employer in cases in
which the union, for whatever reason, does not do so.
This approach emphasizes union autonomy in two ways. First, it sig-
nificantly limits the union's potential liability. In most cases of breach the
union will avoid substantial liability because the bulk of the damages will be
assessed against the employer."' Moreover, the union will avoid all liability if
139 The U.S. Supreme Court, in IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979), recently an-
nounced this policy. The majority in Foust explained that the "compensation principle" in Vaca
was intended "not only to gauge the sufficiency of relief but also to limit union liability." Id. at
49. Four concurring justices, however, disagreed with this statement. They felt that Vaca "stands
only for the proposition that a union not chargeable with compensatory damages may not be
taxed with punitive damages either." Id. at 55.
10 Fox & Sonethal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of Intra-Union Appeals: A Misbegotten Mar-
riage, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 996 (1980).
1 " The compensation principle enunciated in Vaca is that the employer should be
responsible for all damages attributable solely to its breach of contract. The union is only liable
for "increases if any in those damages caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance."
As it appears from the opinion in Vaca, this amount would often be little or nothing. The Court
hypothesized that even if the union had been held in breach of the duty of fair representation "all
or almost all of the [plaintiff's] damages would [have been] attributable to the employer." Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 198 (1967). This reasoning has been applied similarly in other cases. In
DeArroyo a. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packing, the court reasoned that
[i]n a case such as ours, where there has been no suggestion that the Union par-
ticipated in the company's improper discharge and where there was no evidence
that but for the Union's conduct the plaintiffs would have been reinstated or reim-
bursed at an earlier date, we conclude that the union's conduct cannot be said to
have increased or contributed to the damages attributable to the company's
discharge.
DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packing, 425 F.2d 281, 289-90 (1st Cir. 1970). See also
Kesner v. N.L.R.B., 523 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1976) ("the Union's failure fully and fairly
to represent Kesner did not cause him to suffer any loss of earnings").
The U.S. Supreme Court appears to have modified this position, deciding recently in
Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service that the union was liable for $30,000 of the $52,954 awarded in a
fair representation suit. 51 U.S.L.W. 4051 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983). The 5 to 4 decision states that
the union is liable for wages lost from the time that a case would have gone to arbitration.
Whether this means that the court really intended to alter the union's duty of fair representation
accordingly is unclear. The only issue in the case was the proper allocation of liability. In dissent,
Justice White termed the majority's formulation "bizarre" because in many cases it would result
in the union paying damages larger than those assessed against the company that improperly
discharged the employee.
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the underlying grievance is not meritorious. 12 Second, this model respects
union autonomy by avoiding the use of standards originating outside the col-
lective bargaining process. Instead of imposing abstract standards deemed ap-
propriate by the courts the emphasis is on adopting comparative standards of
union behavior. There is room, of course, for variation in the stringency of this
standard — the two most common approaches being "ordinary negligence"
and "gross negligence'' 4s — but the premium is on flexible, comparative
standards. Purely external standards are avoided.
The idea of relying on comparative standards of union behavior to decide
perfunctory processing cases has already received considerable attention from
those advocating the use of negligence concepts.' 44 Much of this discussion has,
unfortunately, been ill-conceived. For example, Robesky and Ruzicka are often
cited as cases that exemplify the negligence approach."' While these cases do
invoke negligence language, they fall short on negligence theory. The courts in
both cases were so preoccupied with the standard for evaluating the union's ac-
tions that they lost sight of the issue of injury and damages. Ruzicka I concen-
trated exclusively on whether allowing a filing date to lapse constituted such
negligent handling of a grievance as to amount to unfair representation.' 46
Ruzicka II continued along those lines, adding the question whether such ac-
tions might nevertheless be excused because they were the union's "prevailing
practice." 147 If the courts had applied the compensation principle, however,
these questions would have been unnecessary because the court in Ruzicka I
had determined that the underlying grievance was not meritorious.'" The
court in Ruzicka I concluded that the aggrieved employee was intoxicated on
the job, as charged, and that his discharge was a permissible penalty.'" In
other words, there was no injury in this case. In tort law, "negligent" acts do
not, in and of themselves, give rise to a cause of action unless they cause actual
damages."° Taking a strict tort view, one must conclude that Ruzicka suffered
no damages.
Unlike the court in Ruzicka, the court in Robesky apparently recognized this
problem. Nonetheless, the Robesky Court decided to overlook it, explaining in a
142
 Id.
'" See supra note 118 for an illustration of the extremes to which this spectrum can be ap-
plied.
' 4 ' See, e.g., Note, A Hint of Negligence, supra note 76, at 1055-70; Determining Standards for a
Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The Case for Ordinary Negligence, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 634
(1980); Flynn & Higgins, supra note 8, at 1148-52. See also, NLRB memo, supra note 6, at 2081
(Rejecting a negligence approach but arguing that "there could be cases where negligence is so
gross as to constitute reckless disregard of the interests of the employee.").
'" See Note, A Hint of Negligence, supra note 76, at 1042 n.5; Note, Determining Standards for
a Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The Case for Ordinary Negligence, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 637
n.21 (1980).
146 Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d at 310.
'" Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 699 F.2d at 1211-12.
148
 Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d at 308.
149 Id. at 313. The court in Ruzicka I, however, remanded the case to the district court
for a fact determination as to whether the discharge was unduly harsh or arbitrary. Id.
' 5° W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 30, at 143-44 (4th ed. 1971).
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footnote that "[s]ince appellant's claim does not depend on her grievance, the
strength or weakness of the grievance is irrelevant. " 151 This explanation is baf-
fling. If any kind of fault or compensation principles are applicable, how can a
claim for unfair representation in grievance proceedings "not depend" on the
validity of the grievance. The answer, of course, exists in the second model of
fair representation: the due process-regulation model. But Robesky was not
decided under the rubric of due process — although whether it should have
been will be discussed later — it was decided under the guise of Vaca fault prin-
ciples. In short, both Robesky and Ruzicka illustrate one problem with the poorly
articulated doctrine of fair representation: it has lead to results that ignore basic
principles of law. In both of these cases, causes of action were allowed when the
connection between the union's actions and the plaintiff's injuries were never
proven.
Robesky points out the second defect in-many of the cases that have relied
on negligence language: they contain little more than meaningless verbal for-
mulas. The union's actions in Robesky were ultimately characterized as "ar-
bitrary." Quite literally, of course, the union did not have a "reason" for its
actions. Yet, the evidence indicated that its actions were unintentional. In trying
to fit unintentional acts into the "arbitrariness" pigeonhole, the court created
some serious problems. Is the union liable whenever an unintentional act
results in a case not being processed further, or are some unintentional acts
more arbitrary than others? Whatever the case stands for is, as Judge Kennedy
generously put it in a separate opinion, "not clear. " 152
The tort-compensation model offers an approach to the perfunctory
processing cases that would minimize union liability for the handling of
meritless grievances, and protect individuals with valid grievances from in-
advertent, but not necessarily "arbitrary," union acts. The model would
repair what some commentators consider a glaring hole in the existing scope of
the duty of fair representation — that it does not give rise to liability for
"negligent" acts of the union.'" It would also, if properly applied, clarify the
confusion surrounding the second-prong of Vaca. Under the tort-compensation
approach, only those with meritorious grievances could ultimately recover
against their union for breaching the duty of fair representation.
B. The Due Process-Regulation Model
The purpose of the tort-compensation model — to compensate individuals
for losses aggravated by the union — may seem so obvious that it is hard to im-
agine any other. But it is possible to view the duty of fair representation
primarily as a method of regulating union behavior. The due process-
regulation model of the perfunctory processing cases takes this view. This
model has as its main goal the regulation of union behavior through judicially-
imposed procedural requirements. So viewed, the regulatory goals of the law
"' Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 573 F.2d 1082, 1085 n.4 (9th Cir 1978).
"2 Id. at 1091 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"' See, e.g., Flynn & Higgins, supra note 8, at 1147.
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can overshadow the compensatory ones. The duty of fair representation is im-
posed to assure certain protections to all individuals as much as it is to address
specific cases.
Under this due process-regulation approach, the union is required to pro-
vide certain minimal procedural safeguards to all grievants. This model has not
been applied as widely or explicitly as the tort-compensation model, but it ap-
pears that the right to be heard and the right to be notified of the hearing are
the primary elements in this approach. 154 Most fundamental, however, is the
right to have one's grievance be considered. In other words, the union is ex-
pected to make a reasoned decision in every case.'" This requirement has been
imposed by many courts.'" The extension of this model to include additional
procedural requirements depends on how courts assess the relative value, cost,
and gravity of other interests involved.'" The due process-regulation approach
does not condition a finding of breach on the meritoriousness of the underlying
grievance. To the contrary, the whole idea of the due process approach is that
there are certain procedures that any grievant should be afforded.
The due process-regulation approach satisfies two concerns. First, it deals
with the apparent inequity of requiring procedural safeguards only when the
underlying grievance is meritorious.' 58 All grievants are assured certain pro-
cedural protections, even if they cannot meet the burden of proving that their
grievatice was meritorious. This approach assures that no one will have the
grievance procedure end with the announcement that the union, well within
the boundaries proscribed by law, "lost" or "misplaced" the grievance. 1 S 9
Second, the due process-regulation model avoids the danger that courts
will exercise "too much substantive supervision over the merits of collective
bargaining decisions."'" One of the major indictments of the tort-com-
pensation model is that it results in judicial intrusions into the collective
bargaining agreements. In deciding whether the union breached its duty the
court must assess the merits of the underlying agreement. In the process, it is
154 See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text.
155 It remains to be seen whether a general requirement of "reasoned decisions" can be
implemented without detailing more specific procedural duties. For a persuasive argument in
favor of such a standard, see Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion
Through A Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rabin]. It seems
likely that this objective would evolve into a requirement of a short statement of reasons. See, e.g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
156 See cases cited infra note 172. See also Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573
F.2d 1080, 1092 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("we should inquire whether the
union decisions lacked a rational basis, or whether by perfunctorily processing a grievance so that
a reasoned decision was not made, the union foreclosed the grievance").
" 7 This approach was suggested in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 262-77. See infra notes
212-27 and accompanying text.
158 That is, after all, the practical effect of both the Vaca approach and the tort-
compensation model.
179
 See Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of
the extent to which decisions on the merits of individual grievances affect the overall meaning of
the collective bargaining agreement, see Cox, supra note 4, at 605-16; Feller, supra note 3, at
704-45.
160 Rosen, supra note 4, at 424.
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argued, the court becomes entangled in questions of contract interpretation
with effects well beyond the individual case. Such intrusions are not properly
part of the collective bargaining process. Under the due process approach,
however, the courts would have no occasion to examine the collective bargain-
ing agreement to determine whether a grievance is meritorious, since all
grievances would be accorded certain procedural protections. Admittedly, this
approach would result in procedural requirements that are not presently con-
tained in most collective bargaining agreements,"' but the autonomy of the
agreement would still be respected on all substantive issues. There is no danger
that a fair representation case would have the effect of reinterpreting the
substance of the collective agreement.' 62
Since the due process-regulation model intends to assure that certain pro-
cedures are followed in the processing of a grievance, courts would assess
damages against the union if the procedures were not followed. Courts would
not assess damages as compensation for injuries as defined by the collective
bargaining agreement. While they might use a worker's lost wages as a
measuring stick for the appropriate amount of damages, they would not be
bound, in assessing the amount of damages, to an amount fixed under the col-
lective bargaining agreement."' The possibility of punitive damages is
definitely consistent with the regulatory goal of this model.'"
Support for the idea of using due process concepts in deciding fair
representation cases is widespread, 1 fi 5 albeit not widely recognized. The U.S.
Supreme Court suggested the idea in Humphrey v. Moore. 166 After deciding that
the union had taken its position in good faith, the Court went on to consider
whether the plaintiff was deprived of a "fair hearing." 167 The Court merely
stated that the result of the hearing would not have been different even if the
matter had been presented differently. 61 a (This statement does not mean that
' 6 ' Basic procedural requirements of the kind that this model would impose are not like-
ly to be contained in the collective bargaining agreement because they involve the relationship
between the employee and the union at the stage of grievance administration before the employer
is ever involved. If this model infringes on existing rules, it would be internal union rules that
would be affected.
162 For a discussion of the extent to which decisions on the merits of individual
grievances affect the overall meaning of the collective bargaining agreement, see Cox, supra note
3, at 605-16; Feller, supra note 3, at 740-45.
163
 The appropriate remedy depends in part on whether the employer is also a party to
the suit. This area of fair representation law is generally unsettled. It has not been decided, for
example, whether employers should be an indispensable party in fair representation suits and if
they are, how damages should be apportioned, See generally Linsey, The Apportionment of Liability for
Damages between Employer and Union in 5 301 Actions Involving a Union's Breach of Its Duty of Fair
Representation, 30 MERCER L. REV. 662 (1979). See also Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service discussed at
supra note 141. Exploring this problem or suggesting the proper measure of damages is beyond
the scope of this article.
' 64
 Justice Blackmun was joined by three other justices in IBEW v. Foust in urging that
punitive damages be allowed in duty of fair representation cases in order to "deter egregious
union conduct." 442 U.S. 42, 60 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in result).
163 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 172.
166
 375 U.S, 335 (1963).
167 Id. at 350.
168 Id. at 352.
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the hearing was necessarily "fair.") The Court's treatment of this issue con-
fused substance with procedure. Justice Goldberg, however, was not so con-
fused. He saw the possible implications of the "fair hearing" issue, even
though the issue was ultimately overlooked by the majority. Goldberg seemed
concerned that an inquiry into the fairness of union procedures might lead to
trial-like hearing standards which would hinder employer-union rela-
tionships. 169
Vaca, of course, belied these concerns by holding that individual
employees have no absolute right to have their grievances arbitrated.' 70 The
Vaca decision, however, should not necessarily be read as a total repudiation of
the "fair hearing" idea. On the contrary, the opinion in Vaca suggested that
some minimal safeguards might be required for every grievant. The reference
is somewhat obscure, but nevertheless it was cited by the Supreme Court some
years later in Hines u. Anchor Freight Motors. 171 Numerous other cases since Vaca
have also taken this lead and examined the "fairness" of union procedures in
analyzing fair representation claims.' 72 Many courts and commentators are ap-
parently reluctant to overlook behavior that appears unfair, even if the merits
of the underlying grievance are dubious."s
Cases that have emphasized the necessity of a "fair hearing," much like
those purporting to adopt negligence theory, suffer from serious conceptual
problems. None of the cases explicitly adopts a due process approach. Ironical-
ly, many of these cases stand under the banner of negligence.
162 Id.at 359.
"° Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
L" 424 U.S. 554, 569 (1976) (citing Vaca for the proposition that "the Union might well
have breached its duty had it ignored [the employee's] complaint or had processed the grievance
in a perfunctory manner." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 194).
' 72 See, e.g., Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Even if
negligent conduct may under some circumstances breach the duty of fair representation, the
Union's presentation here was not so poor as to deprive the plaintiffs of a fair hearing");
Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1080, 1092 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("We inquire whether the discretion granted has been abused by a failure to make a
reasoned decision."); General Truck Drivers Local 315 (Rhodes & Jamieson), 217 N.L.R.B.
616, 619 (1975) ("The violation consists, however, in the lack of fairness in its decisionmaking
process"); E.L. Mustee & Sons, Inc,, 215 N.L.R.B. 203, 209 (1974) ("The union's subsequent
neglect ... deprived Williams of the due process which is included in the concept of fair
representation"). But see Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[A]n ac-
tion based on a duty to fairly represent cannot be based solely on some action or omission by the
union that results in an employee not receiving a 'fair' hearing ... ").
172 This idea has been expressed in many different ways. In some cases, the "require-
ment" of a meritorious grievance is simply overlooked or ignored. See supra note 65. In the con-
text of the existing "arbitrariness" approach it has been suggested that "the union should have
to offer stronger reasons when it refuses clearly meritorious claims than when it rejects or aban-
dons claims of a questionable or frivolous nature." Clark, supra note 3, at 1166. There is also a
popular notion that cases of the most serious consequence (i.e., discharge as opposed to
discipline) should be held to this higher standard. See, e.g., Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways
Ltd., 573 F.2d 1080, 1092 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J., concurring): These sentiments are not,
however, consistent with the second prong of Vasa. The premise of this article is that these con-
cerns can be addressed in a manner that is sound and consistent, only through a new approach to
fair representation.
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In Minnis v. UAW, 1'4
 for example, the plaintiff was discharged when
General Motors determined that he had falsified certain medical forms.' 75 The
union processed the grievance through the three steps established by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and decided not to take the case to arbitration. 178
The plaintiff charged that the union failed to make even a minimal effort to in-
vestigate the claim and process the grievances."' One of the union's defenses
was that General Motors could, under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, discharge the plaintiff without any reason because he was a tem-
porary employee.'" The Eighth Circuit held that "although it may be that in
this case the union could have declined to pursue the grievance," nevertheless
the union's decision to represent the plaintiff created a duty of uncertain
dimensions. 19
 The idea that every grievant deserves a minimal level of pro-
cedural protection helps explain the outcome of this case. The decision in-
dicates that this minimal level of protection is required only in those cases in
which the union comes close to providing protection. Unfortunately, the deci-
sion creates a perverse incentive for unions. If a union declines to pursue a
grievance, it need not provide any procedural protections. However, if it
agrees to represent a grievant, then the union must provide certain procedures.
Faced with such a situation, many unions might decline to take grievances that
they would otherwise pursue.
The Seventh Circuit followed suit in Kessner v. NLRB,'" reasoning that
"it is venerable tort law that purporting to take action where [no duty] exists
creates in itself certain duties.' 8 ' This is not only an arguable misstatement of
tort law, 182 it is an unfortunate addition to fair representation law. If
"venerable tort law" is to govern, then the problem of proximate cause shat-
ters the logic of importing this concept into cases in which there is admittedly
no causal relationship between the injury and the challenged action. Because
the court's premise is that the union would otherwise have no duty to act in
these cases, the conclusion is inescapable that the union cannot be considered a
legal cause of the employee's discharge.
The due process-regulation model offers an alternative by allowing courts
to focus the inquiry in fair representation cases on the fairness of union pro-
cedures. In many fair representation cases, it is apparent that courts are an-
"4 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975).
'" Id. at 853.
"6
 Id.
1 " Id.
"a Id. at 854.
"9 Id.
in 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1976). ,
I"' Id. at 1175.
182 The only duty imposed on those taking action where no duty exists is the duty to
avoid acts which make the situation worse. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 56, at
243-44 (4th ed. 1971). ("If there is no duty to come to the assistance of a person in difficulty or
peril, there is at least a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which make the situation worse.").
There are even exceptions to that statement. Id. In any case, the analogy to aiding those in peril
is clearly inapposite since even the most half-hearted union efforts cannot possibly make the
situation worse than it would be if the union decided to take no action.
December 1982]	 COMPETING MODELS	 33
xious to act when the union does not provide the fundamental elements of fair
procedure. Courts are anxious to act even when the so-called second prong of
Vaca, the requirement that the grievance be meritorious, has not been satisfied.
Unfortunately, the duty of fair representation has not offered an obvious
avenue for such action. The prevailing nomenclature of fair representation law
is simply not adaptable to a due process approach. Thus, the inclination of the
courts to assure basic procedural fairness in all cases has been relegated to
passages of opinions that have the tone and persuasiveness of mere after-
thoughts. The due process model offers courts the opportunity to undertake
this inquiry into procedural fairness in a more principled manner.
IV. REFORMING THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
While the duty of fair representation has expanded beyond the point
where all cases can still rely on the same theoretical model of fair representation
advanced in Vaca, no obvious conclusions can be drawn about what direction
the law should take in the future. Whether either one of the models described in
this article is considered a desirable direction for fair representation law can be
looked at more than one way. Stare decisis could, for example, be considered the
guide by determining which model, if either, is closest to Vaca. However, the
results of such an inquiry would not only be inconclusive, 183 they would beg the
question whether it is appropriate to treat the perfunctory processing cases in
the manner that most clearly resembles Vaca.
A deeper inquiry is necessary to determine the future dimensions of the
duty of fair representation. This inquiry must encompass the kind of interest
balancing that was present in Vaca, and characterizes the most respected com-
mentary in this field.'" It must also consider at the same time the extent to
which a proposed model can yield consistent and predictable results.
A. Basic Interests
The duty of fair representation is a complex problem because it affects the
interests of three distinct groups: the union, the employer, and the
individual.'" These interests are not only interrelated, but they interact dif-
ferently depending on the context in which they exist. Unfortunately, lower
courts seldom engage in any discussion of these interests or of the significance
of the context in which they interact.'" Such a discussion is necessary,
In See supra text accompanying notes 44-65.
184 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S, 171, 191 -93 (1967).
"5 See generally Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435 (1963).
186 One flagrant example of this problem is the application of the "wide range of
reasonableness" language from Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), to perfunc-
tory processing cases. Huffman was a decision pertaining to the negotiation process and it clearly
implies a range of discretion that is not intended for grievance administration. Id. Nevertheless,
this language is cited as authority in cases concerning grievance administration. See, e.g., Printing
& Graphic Communications Local 4 (S.F. Newspaper Printing Co.), 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1050, 1052 (1980).
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however, if the courts are to apply the various models of fair representation in-
telligently.
The interests of the union were explicitly discussed in Vaca. 187
 The•most
obvious interest of the union is in attaining and promoting the collective
strength of the organization. The union's interest in acting as the exclusive
bargaining agent of employees in a certain employment context is basically an
interest in union control. The ability of the union to achieve its goals in
negotiating an agreement will be greatest if the union has complete control over
its bargaining strategy. So too, if the union has maximum control over the
grievance procedure, it will be in the best position to obtain interpretations of
the agreement that are consistent with the original intent of the agreement. Ad-
ditionally, the union has an economic interest in assuring that the grievance
procedure runs efficiently. The union promotes this economic interest by
screening out meritless grievances. If the union is able to predict the scope of
the duty of fair representation, it also contributes to more efficient operations
since the union will be able to rely on its expectations in making decisions. The
union's exposure to liability obviously is minimized under such circumstances.
Finally, the union is interested in the speedy operation of the grievance pro-
cedure. Grievances that drag on can be both an economic and political liabili-
ty . 188
Arguably, the employer's interests in the procedural, if not the substan-
tive, elements of the grievance processing system are similar to those of the
union. The employer is interested in assuring that the grievance mechanism
runs smoothly and produces results that are consistent with the employer's in-
tentions as signatory to the collective bargaining agreement. The employer is
also interested, of course, in minimizing its potentional liability to Section 301
suits.
The third class of interests are the interests of the employees. These in-
terests can be expressed in so many different ways that it is most helpful to
think of the various subclasses of interests held by each group. Employees as a
group have a collective interest in job opportunities.'" Employees also have an
interest in the lawmaking aspects of the grievance procedure. This interest can
affect distinct groups.of employees in both the present and the future. Some ex-
isting employees are directly affected by the outcome of a given grievance, for
example, in disputes over seniority and promotions. Employees will also be af-
fected in the future by whatever precedential value is created by a given case.
Finally, the most direct effect of the grievance mechanism is on the in-
dividual, or individuals, that are pressing the claim. The interest of such
'" Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-99 (1967).
"8 There are other reasons, of course, why a union might want to "screen out" certain
grievances. The union may simply disagree with the employee's interpretation of an admittedly
open question. This situation is almost impossible to avoid when two groups of employees inter-
pret a seniority provision differently. Or, the union might want to use the grievance procedure to
"trade" away an otherwise worthy grievance for concessions in other cases. See, e.g., ILWU
Local 13 v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016
(1972).
189
 This interest is most prevalent in disputes over work preservation. See Cox, supra note
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employees is in winning their suits. This interest may vary, however, in in-
tensity and, possibly, in important legal rights. Some commentators have sug-
gested that when so-called "critical job interests" are at stake — when a case
involves discharge rather than some lesser complaint — the individual should
receive greater protection from the duty of fair representation)" Such critical
interests are always involved in discharge cases, while they may be less com-
pelling in seniority suits. It has also been suggested that certain claims involve
"vested rights" that should always be given protection by the court."' Finally,
the individual also has an interest in knowing that her own grievance will be
treated fairly and with dignity)" In short, employees have certain expectations
about the grievance procedure that reflect both the legitimacy of collective
bargaining and their willingness to support that system.
B. Evaluating the Models of Fair Representation
I. The Tort-Compensation Model
The success with which either model of fair representation can balance
the interests of the union, the employer, and the employee and, at the same
time, bring coherence and predictability to the case law depends on the type of
perfunctory processing case in which it is applied. The use of the tort-
compensation model appears desirable in the most basic type of perfunctory
processing case: the failure of the union to file a timely or accurate grievance.
Even here, however, the model is not completely successful, and it fares less
well in other contexts.'"
The tort-compensation model is likely to be applied most frequently in
those cases in which the union fails to file a grievance in a timely fashion. The
failure of the union to discharge such a simple task surely would give rise to a
finding of negligence or "unreasonable" behavior under the circumstances.
Assuming that the underlying grievance is a meritorious one, the grievant
would be entitled to recover. This result is, in my view, substantively desirable.
The individual's interest in such cases is particularly strong. First, the conse-
quences of an untimely filing are often severe because the employer usually
4, at 613-15.
IN Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests.. Union-Management Authority Versus
Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 631 (1959). See also Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways
Ltd., 573 F,2d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
191 See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 162 (1968);
Blumrosen, supra note 190, at 1494. The vested rights cases are not, however, perfunctory
processing cases except in the unlikely event that the collective bargaining agreement contains
specific procedural rights that are not provided by the union. "Vested rights" cases involve
union decisions that allegedly violate clear provisions in the collective agreement. The concept of
vested rights does not, in this context, add anything to the scope or meaning of the duty of fair
representation. Like cases in the administrative law context decided under an "arbitrariness"
standard, union actions that disregard clearly enunciated rules are obviously unjustified acts. See
Summers, supra, note 4, at 267.
192 See generally Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 303-04
(1975).
192
 See infra text accompanying notes 199-205.
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has, and will assert, the right to reject untimely grievances.'" Second, the indi-
vidual's interest in preventing subtle forms of discrimination and abuse is also
compelling. If the union can, without judicial sanction, eliminate troublesome
grievances by simply "forgetting" them, then the law will breed for-
getfulness.'" Moreover, the individual left with the burden of proving hidden
motives in such cases would be at a serious disadvantage.'"
The union, in contrast, appears to have a much smaller interest in these
cases. Imposing a duty that requires unions to proceed in a timely fashion
might raise union expenses. However, the courts could set a clear standard and
the level of care and compliance required hardly seems burdensome. Strict
compliance with the established deadlines established in the collective bargain-
ing agreement would not require special training or significant resources. Sure-
ly unions would be at least marginally less "forgetful" if the courts held unions
to these deadlines. Unions would, however, then bear the burden of hearing
more grievances. In addition, they might well incur greater liability under this
model than they incur under the present case law. Yet, because not all suits
could meet this model's requirement of a meritorious grievance, many of the
cases in which the union failed to file a grievance in a timely fashion would not
reach the stage at which damages would be apportioned between the employer
and the union. Moreover, the union's liability would not be very large even in
those cases that do end in an award. 1 97 Finally, of course, the union could avoid
such liability simply by filing papers in a timely fashion.
The tort-compensation approach respects union autonomy in one sense —
the standard of care that the courts would apply is one that would be estab-
lished in the first instance by the collective bargaining agreement. If union
compliance with existing deadlines really is burdensome, then in all likelihood
both the union and the employer would favor a change in the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
The tort-compensation approach is, therefore, likely to yield more consist-
ent and predictable results in these types of perfunctory processing cases.
These results would be more predictable than those which follow from existing
standards under which courts have not been able to agree whether the failure to
file a grievance on time rises to the level of a breach.
The model does not, however, resolve the problem of the somewhat mer-
itorious grievance. Of those grievances that the union filed inaccurately or past
the filing deadline, only grievances later deemed meritorious would provide the
basis for recovery for breaches of the union's duty of fair representation. More
significantly, the courts would determine whether the grievance was
194 See Ratner, Some Contemporary Observations on Section 301, 52 GEO. L. J. 260, 265 (1964).
195 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1981),
196 Professor Summers has pointed out that the grievance procedure is "particularly
susceptible to abuse" because it singles out workers individually. Summers, supra note 4, at 393.
19 ' Under the apportionment principle in Vaca, damages are apportioned "according to
the damage caused by the fault of each." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967). As the court
envisioned such an approach, "all or almost all of [a grievant's] damages [will] be attributable"
to the employer that violates the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 198.
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meritorious. Thus, this model leaves the substance of the collective bargaining
agreement open to interpretation by the courts.'"
The tort-compensation model appears even less desirable in other kinds of
perfunctory processing cases. The duty of fair representation could easily
become overly burdensome if this model were applied in cases involving the
alleged failure of the union to provide adequate notification to the grievant, to
investigate the claim properly, or to argue the case competently before the
proper committee. Such claims demand the kind of qualitative assessments
that are sure to lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results.' 99 Moreover, if
expanded to cover such claims, the duty of fair representation could become
significantly more burdensome to unions. The prospect of requiring an
analogue to the right to counsel — something suggested by claims of inade-
quate investigation and representation — is staggering given that grievances
are presently handled by unpaid, untrained stewards in many unions. 2 °
Courts faced with cases challenging the adequacy of notification, in-
vestigation, or argument would, under the tort approach, initially have to con-
sider how a reasonable union official would have acted under the circum-
stances. 20 ' The existing cases suggest that out of this inquiry would come
significant inconsistencies."' A "reasonableness" or "negligence" test begins
to look no better than the existing "arbitrariness" test. Of course, this kind of
uncertainty is inherent in tort law, but its implications are more serious in the
context of collective bargaining where the parties' willingness to agree on
private grievance mechanisms depends on the extent to which these grievance
mechanisms are likely to yield predictable results. 203 Courts, for example, have
been unable to agree upon the degree of knowledge about the collective bar-
gaining agreement that a union official must exhibit in processing
grievances. 204 Surely they would not be able to agree upon the quality of
198 The court in Vaca clearly assumed as much. The majority noted that "even if the
union had breached its duty, all or almost all of Owens' damages would still be attributable to his
allegedly wrongful discharge." Id. at 198. One commentator has argued, however, that liability
insurance might be beyond the financial means of small unions, possibly leading to their financial
collapse. Adomeit, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight: Another Step in the Seemingly Inexorable March Toward
Converting Federaljudges (andJuries) into Labor Arbitrators of Last Resort, 9 CONN. L. REV. 627, 634-35
(1977). I can see no justification for this conclusion so long as fault and apportionment principles
are applied according to Vaca. Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service, supra note 141, recently decided by
the Supreme Court, adds considerable uncertainty to this issue.
19 Compare Service Employees Local 579 (Convacare of Decatur) 229 N. L.R.B. 692,
695 (1977) (failure to interview grievant constitutes breach) with Printing & Graphic Com-
munications Local 4 (S.F. Newspaper Printing Co.) 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1050, 1052 (1980)
(failure to interview grievant not a breach).
20° See supra note 83.
2°' See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 149-66 (4th ed. 1971) (discussion of
reasonableness standard).
"2 See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
20 ' Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-93 (1967).
204 Compare Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 236
(6th Cir. 1978) (failure to properly apply seniority provision constitutes breach); with Denver
Stereotypers and Electrotypers Union, Local 13 v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 134, 137 (10th Cir. 1980)
(overruling the Board's determination that the union breached its duty by interpreting the agree-
ment incorrectly).
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representation that an official should provide before a grievance committee.'"
Thus, the tort-compensation approach holds the very real danger of per-
petuating, if not increasing, uncertainty in the case law. Unions would en-
counter difficulty in predicting the consequences of their actions. While the
consequences of the most obvious types of negligence — forgetting to file
papers on time, for example — would be predictable; uncertainty would still
loom large in relation to other tasks in grievance administration.
The implications of a tort approach in the perfunctory processing cases
depends, of course, on a court's concept of remedies and its application of
proximate cause. The tort-compensation model, if applied properly, requires
two findings before a "negligent" or "arbitrary" action can result in union lia-
bility. First, the court must determine that the underlying grievance is
meritorious. The grievants in Ruzicka and Robesky would lose on these grounds
alone2°6 because the plaintiffs in both cases failed to establish that the employer
had violated the collective bargaining agreement. Second, as in any tort
action,'" the court must find that the union's actions are an actual cause of the
individual's injury. Thus, even if the grievance were a meritorious one, the
plaintiff must prove that the relationship between the union's actions and the
claimed injury was not just a "mere possibility" or based solely on "specula-
tion."'" The tort approach, therefore, could leave the plaintiff unprotected in
many of the perfunctory processing cases. Whether:a more thorough investiga-
tion on the part of the union would have led to a favorable resolution of the
plaintiff's grievance could easily be considered a speculative inquiry. The same
reasoning could be applied to most cases of inadequate notice and of poor
presentation by the union representative. 209
In short, reformulating the duty of fair representation with tort concepts
holds the promise of greater recovery by employees in some of the cases in
which damages would otherwise be available under the collective bargaining
agreement. This added protection would be limited, however, to cases involv-
ing meritorious claims in which recovery is now prohibited because intervening
"negligent" acts of the union are held not to be in violation of the duty of fair
209 Despite statements to the contrary, the NLRB came very close to adopting such an
approach in Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 579 (Convacare of Decatur), 229 N.L.R.B.
692 (1977). A footnote in the opinion disclaims "any implication that, in the informal, in-
vestigative, or bargaining stage of grievance, a collective bargaining representative's duty to an
employee it represents is analogous to that owed by an attorney to a client." Id. at 692 n.2.
Nevertheless, the Board held that the union was in violation for failing to inquire adequately into
the validity of the grievance. Id. at 693. The Board completely obfuscated the decision by
employing practically every nebulous term in the field. In the Board's words: "Mere negligence,
poor judgment, or ineptitude in grievance handling are insufficient to establish a breach of the
duty of fair representation. There comes a point, however, when a union's action or its failure to
take action is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and thus contrary to its fiduciary duty." (cita-
tions omitted). Id. at 695.
2 °6 In both cases the plaintiff claimed that the employers' actions were too harsh, but in
neither case did the court find a breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
207 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 145. Id. at 241.
2° 9 Id. at 241.
2 °9 See supra note 61.
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representation. Employees would not, however, receive any greater protection
in cases in which the underlying grievance is not deemed meritorious by the
court.
The extent to which union acts that appear "negligent" would be re-
dressed under this model depends on the manner in which the courts ascertain
"meritoriousness." A liberal construction, allowing for recovery in borderline
cases, would lead to greater protection for individual workers, but also would
entail equally significant intrusions on the ability of the union and the em-
ployer to structure the terms of the collective agreement.'t° There is, therefore,
a difficult trade-off associated with this model: the greater the protection for in-
dividuals, the lesser the autonomy of the collective agreement. In addition,
uncertainty would arise in most cases regarding the kinds of actions which
would constitute a breach on the union's part. The tort-compensation model
offers no real assurance to those who worry that the duty of fair representation
will become overexpansive.
While courts have scrupulously tried to avoid overreaching applications of
Vaca, 2 " it is clear that there is no principled method for assuring such results.
The tort-compensation model is, quite simply, based on a qualitative evalua-
tion process that in many contexts cannot be limited in a principled fashion. In
the final analysis, it would add little that cannot be achieved through the ex-
isting reasonableness approach. Either approach involves considerable uncer-
tainty and the danger that the courts will unduly intrude on the terms of the
collective agreement.
2. The Due Process-Regulation Model
Predicting the effects of a due process model is difficult because the con-
structs of such a model are subject to more variables than the tort-
compensation model. In addition, fewer courts have explicitly explored the
possibility of applying due process requirements to the duty of fair representa-
tion. Nevertheless, there is a body of case law that is likely to provide some in-
sights into the composition and workings of this model.
Beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly, 212 the U.S. Supreme Court decided a line
of cases in the administrative law context that address problems that are, in
some respects, similar to the problems addressed by the due process model of
fair representation.'" In both the administrative law context and the fair
21 ° See supra text accompanying note 198.
"I The Supreme Court itself interpreted Vaca in a narrow fashion in IBEW u. Foust,
holding that punitive damages are not permissible in fair representation cases. 442 U.S. 42
(1979). The concurring judges criticized the majority for this approach, claiming that the court
had "read into Vaca's affirmative compensation policy a negative pregnant ..." Id. at 54.
212 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
212
	 are, of course, major differences between the procedural due process cases and
the possibility of using due process standards in deciding fair representation cases. Most impor-
tantly, it is built into the foundations of the duty of fair representation that the individual has a
judicially recognized interest in the fairness of the union's actions. There is no need to embark on
the confusing inquiry as to whether sufficient property or liberty interests exist.
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representation context the court's role is to provide protection to an individual
who must otherwise rely on an organization that is authorized to act on behalf
of a much larger group of people. 214 How to provide the individual with an ap-
propriate degree of protection without unduly infringing upon the larger group
interests is the basic question; and in both contexts the court examines the
organization's general procedures rather than the merits of individual cases.
The similarity between certain perfunctory processing cases and those in
administrative law was evidenced in a recent memo on the duty of fair rep-
resentation written by NLRB's general counsel. He opined, in words reminis-
cent of Justice White's statement in Wolff v. McDonnell, 215 that "some kind of a
hearing" is required before a person can be deprived of a property interest,
that no breach should be found in cases in which the union made "some in-
quiry into the facts." 216 This statement, of course, begs the question that has
plagued administrative law since Goldberg: What process is due? The balance
that would be struck between competing interests in order to answer this ques-
tion would also determine the desirability of this model.
Deciding "what process is due" has, in the administrative law context, in-
volved an interest balancing approach. In Matthews v. Eldridge, 217 for example,
Justice Powell suggested that additional procedural safeguards are warranted .
so long as the increased accuracy obtained by these procedures, taking into ac-
count the gravity of the individual's interest, is more than the increased burden
on the government.'" The same calculus might be appropriate in the fair
representation context since it involves an approach similar to that taken in
Vaca."9
This approach can be criticized, however, for two reasons that might
render it undesirable in fair representation cases. First, the interest balancing
approach is so dependent on subjective factors that it might not yield consistent
or predictable results. Whether a given procedure would be deemed unduly
burdensome to the union or significantly helpful to the individual might be
answered differently by different courts. 22° Second, a court applying the
"4 As Rosen explained:
In our contemporary mass society there is somewhat more of a tendency to
recognize that the power exercised by labor unions and by many other such private
associations is very like the political power of the state insofar as the exercise of
such associational power greatly affects important interests of the subject in-
dividuals.
Rosen, supra note 4, at 394.
211
	
U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).
2" NLRB Memo, supra note 6, at 2081.
212 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
2 " Id. at 334-35, 348-49.
"9 The interests of individual employees were balanced against the interests of the
union by the Court in Vaca, although not in as explicit a fashion as in the procedural due process
cases. See supra text accompanying notes 36-44. The burden of requiring unions to take additional
cases through the "costly and time consuming ... grievance procedures" was decisive in the
outcome. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). The Court did consider, albeit in a summary
fashion, whether its formulation posed a "substantial danger to the interests of individual
employee(s)." Id. ai 192.
220 In Service Employees Local 579 (Convacare of Decatur) 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 695
(1977), for example, the union was held in breach of the duty of fair representation for failing to
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Eldridge approach is inclined to require extensive and burdensome procedural
protections. In the due process framework, efficiency concerns rarely, if ever,
weigh more heavily than equity concerns. 221
It has been argued that if the courts incorporate due process standards into
the duty of fair representation then the result would be overly burdensome pro-
cedural protections. Professor Feller, for example, qualified his recommenda-
tion that certain terms of the Administrative Procedures Act be applied in fair
representation cases, 222 by noting that "the formal requirements of hearing
and record" used in administrative law should not be made applicable to
unions. 222 The danger that Professor Feller apparently anticipated is that pro-
cedural requirements could become so detailed as to defeat one major purpose
of the duty of fair representation: to facilitate private grievance settlement
through collective bargaining.'" The procedural due process cases have been
criticized precisely for the negative effect that they have had on the creation of
alternative, innovative approaches to dispute settlement and decision-
making."' It would be senseless for the courts to require unions, which already
have a mechanism for dispute settlement, to adopt an approach resembling the
judicial forum. The union is supposed to be able to avoid the cumbersome re-
quirements of the judicial form by processing grievances fairly.
The legitimacy of the concern that due process standards would dis-
courage private grievance settlement depends, of course, on the specific pro-
cedural requirements that would flow from this approach. Minimal procedural
protections could, however, address two major concerns expressed in many of
the perfunctory processing cases: (1) the failure of the union to provide any
hearing for the grievant, and (2) the failure to give adequate notice when a
hearing is provided. The procedural due process cases indicate that both the
opportunity to be heard and the requirement of adequate notice are likely to be
fundamental in any scheme of union due process.'" Neither of these pro-
cedural protections would require significant expenditures by the union, while
seek out the grievant's version of the facts at issue. However, in Printing & Graphic Communica-
tions Local 4 (S.F. Newspaper Printing Co.), 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1050, 1052 (1980), the
union was not held in breach for failing to obtain the discharged employee's version of the inci-
dent.
"I Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing, " 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
222 Feller, supra note 3, at 811.
222 It should be noted, however, that Professor Feller's recommendations concerning the
requirements of the duty of fair representation are conditioned on the premise that breaches of
the duty be remediable only in a suit to compel the union to proceed. Id. at 813-17.
224 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-93 (1967).
1" See, e.g., Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1301.04 (1975).
226 These two possible requirements have received the most attention by courts examin-
ing the fairness of union procedures. See, e.g., Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d
1082 (9th Cir. 1978) (notice); General Truck Drivers, Local 315, 217 N.L.R.B. 616, 619 (1975)
(opportunity to be heard). This is not the only way to envision basic procedural rights, however.
Professor Rabin has argued that the "right to receive a meaningful explanation" is the core
safeguard against arbitrary actions. Rabin, .supra note 155, at 77-80. This requirement, proposed
in the context of government employee dismissal cases might be useful in the context of the duty
of fair representation. See id. at 74-87.
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both have the potential for increasing the likelihood that the individual's ver-
sion of the grievance would be heard. The opportunity to be heard requirement
would redress most claims of perfunctory processing. Obviously, if the union
failed to file a grievance on time, the employee was denied an opportunity to be
heard. Moreover, some of the claims alleging inadequate investigation by the
union — cases in which extending:the duty of fair representation might appear
to imply significant increases in union expenditures — involve nothing more
than a claim that the union did not hear the grievant's side of the story. 227 A re-
quirement involving only this much investigation would be much less burden-
some than one requiring a hearing in which all possibly relevant witnesses are
called.
A requirement that the union provide minimal procedural safeguards ap-
pears to have some distinct advantages over the tort approach for implement-
ing the perfunctory processing language in Vaca. It could create clearer re-
quirements for the union, while turning the judicial inquiry in these cases away
from negligence and arbitrariness — concepts with limited relevance to the
issues involved in assessing union procedures. Since the due process approach
is tied to union procedures, not to the facts of the underlying grievance, out-
comes in individual cases would have much stronger precedential effect. The
decision, for example, that all grievants must have a hearing could not be
distinguished away in future cases in which the union claimed that the underly-
ing facts were different. The tort-compensation approach is inherently more
susceptible to such claims and thus to more inconsistent results. Different
jurisdictions might still come to different conclusions under the due process ap-
proach, but within any jurisdiction it would be easier to predict the outcome of
future cases based on cases already decided. In addition, a process-oriented ap-
proach would be more consistent and predictable than one based on tort con-
cepts since the union would know what is expected of it and could plan accord-
ingly. Thus, in a seniority dispute, for example, the union would know that it
must hear the claims of all those involved. The kind of confusion left in the
wake of Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., as to what else the union could pos-
sibly do to insure fair procedures would be eliminated. 228 Finally, this ap-
proach offers a solution to the difficult problem of the partially meritorious
grievance. No longer would courts have to stretch their interpretation of the
word meritorious and, in the process, intrude on the substantive interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement. Assurance of minimal protections
would provide the increased measure of fairness and legitimacy that individual
workers have expected all along.
The right to certain investigatory procedures or to some specified level of
representation skills is, however, quite different. Such procedures could in-
227 See, e.g., Web Pressmen and Platemakers Local 4 (S.F. Newspaper Printing Co.),
249 N.L.R.B. No. 23; Service Employees Local 579 (Convacare of Decatur), 229 N.L.R.B. 692
(1977); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975).
228 See infra text accompanying notes 94-103. The union in Smith v. Hussman
Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980), of course, would not have
been held in breach of the duty under this model.
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volve much greater expense to the union than a notice and hearing require-
ment. Requiring union officials to interview potential witnesses to some inci-
dent, particularly if the case involves a dispute with a long history, could con-
sume considerably more time than it would take to hear the grievant's version.
Arguably, however, a court would conclude under the Eldridge approach that
the increased burden of such procedures on the union exceeds the expected in-
crease in accuracy. But that is part of the problem: there would be uncertainty
and inconsistency in the requirements. The uncertainty involved in making
such determinations and the disadvantages for the collective bargaining proc-
ess could be avoided by a judicial determination that the same minimal protec-
tions are to be required in all cases.
In short, the due process model offers a desirable solution to two problems
underlying the perfunctory processing cases. First, the model effectively ad-
dresses the inconsistencies of the case law and the uncertain expectations of
those involved in grievance administration by establishing clear requirements
for grievance processing. Second, the model provides protection for the griev-
ant, assuring basic procedural protections for all while honoring overall integri-
ty of the grievance administration system. The due process-regulation model
would assure all grievants some minimal amount of fairness without intruding
on the resolution of individual disputes under the collective agreement.
CONCLUSION
The duty of fair representation has expanded tremendously since its crea-
tion in 1944. It is now applied to such varying activities as negotiating a collec-
tive agreement, administering the grievance mechanism, overseeing pension
fund management and taking grievances to arbitration. Since Vaca the duty to
avoid the "perfunctory processing" of grievances has also been added. The
relationship among employees, employers and unions varies greatly in these
contexts. The theoretical framework of the duty of fair representation,
however, has not adapted well to these differences. Although cases involving
perfunctory processing should be treated differently from those in other con-
texts, often they are not. Vaca still is treated as the kind of "guidebook" to fair
representation law that Justice Fortas feared it would be. Unfortunately, Vaca
does not provide clear or consistent guidance for the perfunctory processing
cases since these cases, unlike Vaca, challenge union procedures, not union
reasoning.
It is time to recognize that the current theories of fair representation do
not deal adequately with these cases. The two models of fair representation
posed in this article, both stemming from concerns expressed in Vaca, can help
explain these cases. The tort-compensation model is applied in those cases in
which the union's negligent actions prevent a grievant from recovering
damages under the collective bargaining agreement. The due process-
regulation model is applied in those cases in which the procedural integrity of
union . processing is at issue. Both of these models offer a clearer view of the per-
functory processing cases than exists in the current cases.
Selecting the most appropriate path depends on how one completes the
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calculus outlined in the last part of this article. It also depends, to a large ex-
tent, on how one views the philosophic question whether the union control
theory or the individual rights theory is more desirable. The tort-compensation
model is most consistent with the union control theory because, although it
may 'expand the scope of the duty, it leaves to the union the task of deciding
both in the collective bargaining agreement and as a matter of prevailing prac-
tice, what process is appropriate. The individual rights theory is more consist-
ent with the due process-regulation model because it is based on the premise
that all grievants have the right to certain procedures.
It has been said that the grievance process provides union members with
"the opportunity for a meaningful democracy within the plant and local
union." 229 The due process-regulation approach is the preferable approach
because only it offers the assurance that this process will always carry with it
the elements necessary to make that opportunity a meaningful one. The duty
is, after all, one of "fair," not just reasonable or non-arbitrary, representation.
229 KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT: THE POWER OF INDUSTRIAL
GROUPS 184 (1961).
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